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New Punitive Damages in Mexican Law – or the
Chronicle of a Failed Legal Transplant Foretold?
BY EDGARDO MUÑOZ1 AND RODOLFO VÁZQUEZ-CABELLO2
ABSTRACT
In February 2014, the Supreme Court of Mexico, referring to some
American cases and scholarly articles, held that punitive damages must be
awarded to a tort plaintiff as part of the indemnity afforded by Mexican law
under the head of moral damages (daños morales). Before this landmark
decision, punitive damages were unknown to the Mexican legal system.
The authors submit that the legal transplant carried out in Mexico has a few
problems, which concern both the incorrect understanding of the adopted
rule and the incompatibility of the host legal system. As a consequence,
punitive damages, as they stand now in Mexico, will not properly
accomplish the function that punitive damages have in the United States,
i.e., to effectively and fairly punish tortfeasors and dissuade potential ones,
unless some post-transplant adjustment is implemented. In order to
demonstrate their hypothesis, the authors apply the functional method of
comparative law and the theory of legal transplants, including the criteria
developed by prominent comparatists, to determine the likelihood of
success transplanting punitive damages in Mexico.
Keywords: Mexico, Punitive Damages, Comparative Law, Legal
Transplants, Functional Method.
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Introduction

On February 26, 2014, the Supreme Court of Mexico held that punitive
damages must be awarded to a tort victim as part of the compensation
afforded by Mexican law under the head of so-called moral damages
(daños morales). 3 Before such a landmark decision, punitive damages
were unknown to the Mexican legal system.4 Punitive damages, also called

3. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, Feb. 26, 2014, Amparo Directo 30/2013,
http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?AsuntoID=15359
5.
4. Prior to the aforementioned decision, despite the statutory enactment of class
actions in 2011 in Mexico, it is regrettable that the Federal Congress decided not to
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exemplary damages, are part of the torts law in some common law
jurisdictions, especially, in most states of the Unites States.5 Their purpose
is to punish the tortfeasor for outrageous misconduct and to deter him and
others from similar misconduct in the future.6 Under common law, they
are non-compensatory damages in that they do not intend to compensate a
plaintiff for the actual financial or emotional losses suffered due to the
harm caused by the defendant.7
Punitive damages have been subject to criticism in the United States
and other common law jurisdictions, in particular, regarding the occurrence
of large amount of indemnities granted in some cases,8 the view that it is
anomalous when the plaintiff recovers a financial windfall, or that any
award imposed by means of punishment should be paid to the State.9 In
spite of such criticism, there are many benefits that this legal concept could
bring to the Mexican society. Punitive damages could help reduce the low
incorporate punitive damages into Mexico’s legal framework or even in matters dealing
with environmental law. See Rodrigo González-Camarena, Punitive Damages and Their
Alternatives in Mexican Environmental Law, 6 MEXICAN L. REV. 45, 47 (2013).
5. Punitive damages may be awarded in all States of the United States with some
restrictions in Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington.
Louisiana is a Civil Code jurisdiction that refused to recognize punitive damages, except as
statutorily authorized. Nebraska and New Hampshire are common law jurisdictions that
refused to adopt the remedy of punitive damages entirely. Massachusetts and Washington
are common law jurisdictions that do not recognize punitive damages except as may be
recovered under specific statutory authorization. See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, Punitive
Damages in the United States, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW
PERSPECTIVES, 155 (Helmut Koziol & Vanessa Wilcox eds., 2009).
6. Henry Brooke, A Brief Introduction: The Origins of Punitive Damages, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES 1 (Helmut Koziol & Vanessa
Wilcox eds., 2009); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 394 (Pearson
5th ed. 2008); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages by Numbers: Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 18 S. CT. ECON. REV. 262 (2010), citing Exxon Shipping Co., 554
U.S. at 481; Bradley Raboin, PUNISH THE CROWN, BUT PROTECT THE GOVERNMENT: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE TORT LIABILITY FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN ENGLAND AND
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE UNITED STATES, 24 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 262 (2016).
7. JASON TALIADOROS, THE ROOTS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AT COMMON LAW: A LONGER
HISTORY, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253 (2016); Hersch & Viscusi, id. at 262 (citing Exxon
Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 482); Brooke, id. at 1; COOTER & ULEN, id. at 394; SEBOK, supra
note 5, at 155.
8. Acknowledging criticism of punitive damages, see Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at
497.
9. These were part of the opinions expressed by opponents to exemplary damages
during the Opinion Consultation carried out by the English Law Commission in 1995. See
Brooke, supra note 6, at 2. See also Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal
Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 371 (2003).
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safety standards that are at the origin of government corruption,10 corporate
negligence11 and a social culture that worries little about the consequences
of accidents to other people12 or the harm to the environment.13
In light of their foreign origin, the suitability of the Mexican Supreme
Court’s adoption of punitive damages must be analyzed under some
methods of comparative law. In particular, we use the functional method
to determine whether punitive damages under the American legal system
are even comparable to those that were just introduced into Mexico, and
which ones fulfills their function better. 14 We also frame our analysis
within the theory of legal transplants, the metaphor that comparatists use to
explain the movement of legal rules from one legal system to another.15
We conclude that the legal transplant carried out in Mexico has a few
problems that concern both the incorrect understanding of the adopted rule

10. We do not submit that punitive damages should be awarded against the State, but
corruption has encouraged citizens and companies to breach safety regulations that led to
accidents and damages to victims and that could have been detected by government agents.
For example, wrongful construction of a building that gets the final occupational
government permit through bribes.
11. In Mexico, negligence practices among corporations are frequent due to the
possibility of operating without being detected by law enforcement agencies.
12. To some extent, one may say that such is a characteristic of Mexican culture.
Mexican society gives to physical danger and death less importance than other cultures do.
Mexican poet Octavio Paz once said that “[t]he Mexican ... is familiar with death, jokes
about it, caresses it, sleeps with it, celebrates it. True, there is as much fear in his attitude as
in that of others, but at least death is not hidden away: he looks at it face to face, with
impatience, disdain or irony: If they are going to kill me tomorrow do it now.” OCTAVIO
PAZ, EL LABERINTO DE LA SOLEDAD Y POSTADA 22 § 8 (Fondo de Cultura Económica,
1992).
13. In the United States, punitive damages are often considered by some scholars as a
signal virtue of the American tort system and a necessary and unique mechanism to protect
its citizenry, especially against the risk of corporate malfeasance. See T. KOENIG & M.
RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 69 ff (NYU Press 2003).
14. RALF MICHAELS, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 342 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds.,
2006).
15. In Section 3 below we argue that irrespective of whether the Supreme Court of
Mexico has created new law in contravention to its judicial role and the division of powers
clause in the Mexican Constitution or whether it was simply uncovering old Mexican law by
means of a new interpretation on the scope of moral damages, it has, as a matter of fact,
imported into Mexican law a new legal institution of foreign origin, thus, performing a legal
transplantation in the way Alan Watson explained it in its work Legal Transplants: An
Approach To Comparative Law: legal transplants is the phenomenon of “moving of a
rule…from one country to another.” See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (U. of Ga. Press 1993).
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and the incompatibility of the host legal system. Punitive damages, as they
stand now in Mexico, may not properly accomplish the function that
punitive damages have in the United States, i.e., to effectively and fairly
punish tortfeasors and dissuade potential ones,16 unless there is some posttransplant adjustments.
The Mexican Supreme Court’s decision is already a great step forward
in this field, but regrettably insufficient. The limited role of judicial
precedents in Mexico, that is, the Court’s task to interpret the law only and
the constitutional restriction to create new law,17 means that it would take
many years before Courts in Mexico develop proper guidelines for the
adequate and complete transplantation of punitive damages. This article
aims at contributing to the scholarly discussion on the correct
understanding and adoption of punitive damages in Mexico.
The following section summarizes the facts, procedural history, and
rulings of the Supreme Court’s decision on February 26, 2014 that awarded
punitive damages for the first time in Mexico. Section Three discusses
why the aforementioned decision amounts to a legal transplant irrespective
of whether the Supreme Court intended to create a new law or simply to
uncover old Mexican law by interpreting the scope of moral damages.
Section Four reviews the criteria to determine the degree of success of a
legal transplant. Section Five highlights specific problems and forecasts
the results of the transplantation of punitive damages in Mexico. Section
Six proposes some changes and adjustments to the Mexican punitive
damages. Section 7 concludes.
2.

The Supreme Court of Mexico’s Decision of Feb. 26, 2014

A summary of the facts of this decision is essential to understand the
types of tort claims that the Supreme Court of Mexico purported to address
with the award of punitive damages. A brief overview of the procedural
history and rulings of this case will also allow the readers who are
unfamiliar with Mexico’s legal system to understand the components of
civil liability and indemnity of which the new punitive damages are now a
part of.

16. Brooke, supra note 6, at 1; COOTER & ULEN supra note 6, at 394; Hersch & Viscusi,
supra note 6, at 262, citing Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2615.
17. See Section 3 below.
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2.1 The Facts
In September 2010, the victim, a young man, traveled to the Mexican
beach city of Acapulco to stay at the Mayan Palace Resort (the “Hotel”)
and celebrate the Mexican Independence Day. 18 The victim and three of
his friends were kayaking in the Hotel’s artificial lake, and their kayak
capsized. 19 Unfortunately, an underwater water pump that had not
received proper maintenance for years had caused the artificial lake to
become electrified. 20 Approximately twenty-five minutes passed before
the Hotel staff could shut down the electricity to allow for the victim to be
rescued from the water.21 The Hotel had no emergency protocols for this
type of case.22 The lifeguards had to wait until the victim’s girlfriend and
her companion were on shore to rescue the victim and his friends.23 Other
guests at the hotel administered first aid to the victim.24 It took the staff
some twenty minutes to take the victim to the Hotel clinic after being
pulled out from the water.25 The Hotel had no ambulance, so it took extra
forty minutes for an ambulance to finally pick up the victim. 26
Unfortunately, by the time the ambulance finally took the victim to a
hospital, he had no vital signs.27
2.2 The First Instance and Appeallate Proceedings
On February 21, 2011, the victim’s parents sued the Hotel before the
Superior Tribunal of Mexico City, seeking compensation for moral
damages pursuant to Article 1916 of the Mexico’s City Civil Code.28 The
concept of moral damages is a specific type of injury to one’s self-esteem,
affections, relationships, etcetera, and shares some similarities to the
concept of pain and suffering under the common law system. Like pain the
suffereing, the indemnity for moral damages is also compensatory by
18. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 116.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 117.
22. Id. at 116.
23. Id. at 117.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. This provision has adopted Article 1916 of the Federal Civil Code that serves as a
model for all other States Civil Codes. The Federal Civil Code supplements various Federal
laws, including the Code of Commerce that applies to all trade transactions in Mexico.
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nature.29 On August 9, 2012, the Superior Tribunal of Justice of Mexico
City awarded eight million Mexican pesos to the victim’s parents as moral
damages.30 Both parties appealed and the matter was turned over to the
Appeals Chamber of the Superior Tribunal of Justice of Mexico City. The
victim’s parents requested, among other things, to be compensated in
addition to the moral damages of eight million Mexican pesos, to
distinguish the indemnity granted for the actual physical loss from moral
damages, as well as a revision of the criteria considered in calculating the
moral damages.31 On the Hotel’s side, it argued that the trial court had
infringed several evidence rules and that, in any event, the victim’s parents
had not demonstrated that the Hotel had any duty to the victim nor had it
breached any legal provision or duty of care applicable in the present
case.32 In addition, the Hotel also requested a clearer distinction between
actual physical loss and moral damages, and challenged the trial court’s
calculation of the moral damages which was based on the victim’s “life
expectations” and the money invested by his parents up to the time of his
death.33 Finally, the Hotel argued that the trial court should have applied
the law of the State of Guerrero34 where the tort conduct took place and
thus, the amount of moral damages should not be higher than one-third the
amount awarded for actual physical loss,35 or in the alternative, the amount
of moral damages should be calculated pursuant to the rules on indemnity
in the Federal Labor Law.36
On November 28, 2012, the Appeals Chamber of the Superior Tribunal
of Justice of Mexico City issued its decision, and reduced the amount of
indemnity for moral damages to one million Mexican pesos. The Appeals
Chamber found that in spite of the high degree of liability proved against
29. See Section 5 below and JORGE A. VARGAS, MEXICAN LAW FOR THE AMERICAN
LAWYER 411 (Carolina Academic Press 2009); Jorge A. Vargas, Moral Damages under the
Civil Law of Mexico - Are These Damages Equivalent to U.S. Punitive Damages?, 35 U. OF
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 266 (2004).
30. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 2.
31. Id. at 16-17.
32. Id. at 18-21.
33. Id. at 22-24.
34. In particular, the Hotel referred to Article 1768 of the Civil Code of the State of
Guerrero.
35. This conflict of laws argument was brought to the trial court, but the court did not
address it in its decision.
36. In particular, Articles 500-502 of the Mexico Federal Labor Law stipulate some
rules on the amount of compensation that employers are required to pay to employees for
accidents that take place in the context and during their labor activities.
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the Hotel, it was unreasonable to award an indemnity that was fifteen times
the value of its share capital. The Appeals Chamber also held that moral
damages were not intended to compensate “life expectations” under
Mexican law, which should not have been considered by the trial court in
determining the amount of indemnity.37
2.3 Constitutional Claims
Unhappy with the Appeals Chamber’s decision, the victim’s parents
filed an amparo directo suit to overturn it.38 More specifically, the victim’s
parents sought a declaration that parts of Article 1916 of the Mexico City’s
Civil Code were unconstitutional.39 The victim’s parents argued that the
criterion of the “victim’s financial situation” set forth in such a provision to
determine the amount of indemnity for moral damages infringed the
constitutional rights of equal treatment and non-discrimination. 40 The
victim’s parents contended that the relevant criterion to determine the
amount of compensation was the actual loss actually caused to the
intangible elements of moral damages such as feelings, beliefs, honor and
physical appearance.41

37. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 29-30.
38. Amparo is a remedy for infringement of constitutional rights. There are two types:
Amparo Directo and amparo indirecto. The differences between the two concern
procedures and jurisdiction. The authority responsible in Amparo Directo suits is the
Collegiate Circuit Court and, exceptionally, the Supreme Court of Justice. Amparo Directo
may be brought to assert one person’s constitutional right to judiciary protection against a
decision of any Mexican court at any level. In amparo indirecto, the suit starts at the district
court level and the decision of the later may be revised by a Collegiate Circuit Court or the
Supreme Court of Justice. Amparo indirecto regards the challenge of legislation and
administrative decisions that affect the general population. See STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL.,
MEXICAN LAW 26667 (Oxford U. Press 2004).
39. Article 1916 of the Mexico City’s Civil Code reads: “El monto de la indemnización
lo determinará el juez tomando en cuenta los derechos lesionados, el grado de
responsabilidad, la situación económica del responsable, Y LA DE LA VÍCTIMA, así como las
demás circunstancias del caso” (emphasis added). We translate here as the following: “The
amount of indemnity is to be determined by the judge taking into account the rights
infringed, the degree of duty, the financial situation of the tortfeasor, AND OF THE VICTIM, as
well as other circumstances of the case” (emphasis added).
40. As explained by the Supreme Court of Mexico in the decision at stake, the right to
equal treatment and nondiscrimination is found in Article 1 of the Mexico Constitution,
Articles 1 and 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Preamble and Article II
of the Inter-American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Mann, and Articles 1.1 and
24 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. See Supreme Court of Mexico,
First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 102.
41. Id. at 33-34.
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The amparo directo claim was first registered in the First Circuit with
the Second Collegiate Tribunal under docket number 30/2013. However,
in light of the importance of determining whether Article 1916 of the
Mexico’s City Civil Code was discriminatory, considering that the victim’s
financial situation should be taken into account for calculating the amount
of indemnity, on March 1, 2013, the victim’s parents requested the
Supreme Court of Mexico to exercise its certiorari power to decide the
amparo directo claim. 42 On March 29, 2013, the First Chamber of the
Supreme Court of Mexico agreed to exercise its certiorari power to decide
the case.43
2.4 The Supreme Court’s Rulings
The Supreme Court of Mexico started the ruling part of its decision by
providing the legal framework where moral damages operate, as well as
their definition. On the former, the Court explained that moral damages
are part of the compensation, together with actual physical losses, afforded
for both contract and tort44 injuries.45 With regard to their definition, the
Court refer to Article 1916 of the Mexico’s City Civil Code which states
that “moral damages are any loss caused to a person’s feelings, affections,
beliefs, decorum, honor, reputation, privacy, and other physical aspects or
self-esteem”.46 Then, the Court explained that the notion of moral damages
focuses on non-physical or spiritual interests that must be protected,
including anguish, afflictions, humiliation, suffering, or psychological
pain.47
The Supreme Court of Mexico also explained that there are three
subspecies of moral damages. First there is the loss of honor, which
includes damage to someone’s personal image and privacy.48 Second, there
is the cosmetic loss, which reflects in the mortification of the victim as a

42. In Mexico, the writ of certiorari is known as facultad de atracción, whereby the
Supreme Court may decide to review a lower court decision, in lieu of leaving a Collegiate
Circuit Court with original jurisdiction to decide the Amparo Directo claims. This
prerogative of the Supreme Court of Mexico is found in Article 107(v), last paragraph of the
Mexico Constitution.
43. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 4.
44. In the words of the Supreme Court of Mexico as “the legal duty not to harm other.”
Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 38
45. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 38-39.
46. Id. at 42.
47. Id. at 43.
48. Id. at 44.
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consequence of harm to her own body. 49 Third, there is the harm to
feelings, causing affliction to the victim.50
In addition, the Supreme Court developed that indemnity for moral
damages redresses both the pecuniary consequences or loss that may be
calculated with some certainty and the non-pecuniary consequence or loss
that cannot be quantified with exactness but is certain that occurred. The
first category includes missing revenues as a consequence of the slowdown
of work activities caused by depression.51 The second category regards, for
example, the misery caused by the breach of a transport contract that ruins
the victim’s holiday or honeymoon. The Court also confirmed that the
indemnity granted for moral damages may cover both present and future
losses,52 and that the right to moral damages is autonomous to the right to
actual physical damages.53
2.5 The Calculation of Indemnity For Moral Damages
The Supreme Court of Mexico pointed out that the amount of
indemnity to be granted by courts for moral damages was discretionary,54
but subject to the criteria in Article 1916 of the Mexico City Civil Code55
and the right to a “fair indemnity” in Article 1 of the Constitution of
Mexico and other human rights treaties.56 With regard to criteria in Article
1916 of the Mexico City Civil Code, the Court explained that in the
calculation of moral damages, regard is to be had of the rights infringed,
the degree of liability and financial situation of the tortfeasor, and the
victim, and other surrounding circumstances of the case. In relation to the
criterion of financial situation of the victim, which was the basis of the
victim’s parents amparo directo claim, the Court decided that it was
unconstitutional to consider the economic situation of the victim in order to
calculate the non-pecuniary consequences of moral damages, but
constitutional to consider the economic situation of the victim in order to
determine the amount of the pecuniary consequences of moral damages.57
49. Id. at 45.
50. Id. at 46.
51. Id. (citing RAMÓN D. PIZARRO, DAÑO MORAL. PREVENCIÓN. REPARACIÓN. PUNICIÓN.
EL DAÑO MORAL EN LAS DIVERSAS RAMAS DEL DERECHO 35 (Hammurabi 2d ed. 2004)).
52. Id. at 47.
53. Id. at 47-49.
54. Id. at 92.
55. Id. at 93.
56. Id. at 85 ff.
57. Id. at 106-09, 112.
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What came next in the Supreme Court’s decision was not part of the
arguments raised by the victim’s parents, but an important holding by the
Court which not only had effects on the amount of damages finally
awarded in this specific case, but also in the scope of moral damages under
Mexican law. The Supreme Court held that, on the basis of the criterion of
“degree of liability and financial situation of the tortfeasor” in Article 1916
of the Mexico City Civil Code and the human rights principle of fair
indemnity, punitive damages may be awarded by courts under the head of
moral damages.
In relation to Article 1916 of the Mexico City Civil Code, the Supreme
Court of Mexico explained that the express mandate of this provision
considers the degree of liability and financial situation of the tortfeasor in
the calculation of moral damages, coupled with its legislative history, that
treats damages not only as a means to redress any pain but also to punish
the tortfeasor, should lead to a conclusion that the amount of indemnity
awarded to compensate a victim’s losses shall be enough to redress such
loss and to condemn the tortfeasor’s conduct. 58 In particular, the Court
considered that the statement “tort compensation does not only redress the
victim and punish the tortfeasor” in the legislative records that led to the
latest changes to Article 1916 on December 31, 1982, meant that the
indemnity was not capped by the actual loss but that the amount may be
affected by other aggravating elements, i.e., the tortfeasor’s conduct and
his/her financial situation.59 However, it is worth noting that the Supreme
Court used the phrase “compensate the damages caused to the victim,”60
which is important for the analysis that we advance in Section Five below.
With regard to the right to a fair compensation in Article 1 of Mexico’s
Constitution and Article 63.1 of the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights, the Supreme Court of Mexico first cited the decision of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights in Cantonal Benavides v. Peru,
endorsing the view that the victim’s right to adequate compensation is, as a
second facet, “sending a message of official disapproval for the violations
of the human rights in question and the commitment that they will not
happen again.” 61 Relying on this decision and the statement of the
Argentinean scholar RAMÓN D. Pizarro, the Supreme Court of Mexico
concluded that damages compensation is a social expression of disapproval
58. Id. at 89-91.
59. Id. at 89-91.
60. Id. at 91.
61. Id. at 86, n.121 (citing Cantoral Benavides vs. Perú, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
88, ¶ 53 (Dec. 3, 2001).
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of any legal wrong, and if punishment is not granted, the expressed
disapproval practically disappears.62
The Supreme Court of Mexico did not clarify whether punitive
damages were to be awarded for the pecuniary consequences of moral
damages or only for the non-pecuniary consequences of moral damages.
We understand this as an oversight of the Court rather than a mistake in the
ruling. From the logic of this decision, we submit that punitive damages
could only be part of the non-pecuniary consequences of moral damages
since the amount of indemnity for the pecuniary consequences are limited
to the spiritual loss that may be calculated with certainty, thus, its quantum
may not be affected by other aggravating elements, such as the degree of
liability or financial situation of the tortfeasor.
As a consequence, the Supreme Court of Mexico awarded over 30
million Mexican pesos in moral damages to the victim’s parents in light of
the gross infringement of the victim’s rights, the high degree of liability,
and financial situation of the defendant.63 It also redesigned the scope of
civil liability (tort and contractual)64 by adding punitive damages under the
head of moral damages as the diagram in Chart Number One (Mexico)
summarizes at the bottom of this article.
3.

The Transplant of Punitive Damages Into Mexican Law

In the February 2014 decision, the Supreme Court of Mexico was
explicit about the American origin of the punitive damage notion that it
adopted. The Court cited American scholars to explain the punitive and
deterrent nature that the punitive award has on the defendant. 65 It also
referred to Pizarro to assert that “damages compensation is a social

62. Id. at 88, n.128 (citing PIZARRO, supra note 51, at 532).
63. Id. at 124.
64. Moral damages may also be granted in contract law claims under Mexican law, and
the Supreme Court of Mexico did not limit the availability of punitive damages to tort
claims. However, in Section 6 we submit that part of the changes in the adoption of punitive
damages should be to limit their awards to tort law claims.
65. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 87,
nn.125-26. The Supreme Court of Mexico relied on the following American journal articles
(somehow old for the case): David W. Owen, Punitive damages in products liability
litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1279 (1976); David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of
Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705 (1988); Fred W. Morgan, The Evolution of Punitive
Damages in Product Liability Litigation for Unprincipled Marketing Behavior, 8 J. OF PUB.
POL’Y & MARKETING 279 (1989); Nanette A. O’Donnell, Punitive damages in Florida
negligence cases: How much negligence is enough?, 24 U. OF MIAMI L. REV. 803 (1988).
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expression of disapproval of any legal wrong, and if punishment is not
granted, the expressed disapproval practically disappears.”66 However, in
that instance, it is doubtful whether Pizarro was referring to punitive
damages in the context of the common law legal systems or, rather, to a
general effect that compensating the actual loss may have over a tortfeasor.
In fact, Argentinean law does not recognize punitive damages. The draft
bill for the new Argentinean Civil and Commercial Code, which entered
into effect on August 1, 2014, contemplated the award of punitive damages
in Article 1714.67 However, this proposal was rejected in its final bill.68
The Anglo-American background of the punitive damages awarded by the
Supreme Court of Mexico is also evidenced in the Concurrent Opinion
issued along with the commented decision. 69 In Justice Cossío Diaz’
concurrent opinion, he recommended to look at American scholarship and
cases from the Supreme Court of the United States to determine the just
amount of punitive damages in relation to the actual physical damage
awarded to a victim.70
But why exactly did the Supreme Court of Mexico apply a common
law legal institution for the first time as part of Mexican law? This case
had no relation or contacts with any foreign law or jurisdiction. The the
plaintiff in the amparo directo claim did not bring any theory regarding the
relevance of punitive damages as part of the indemnity under a common
law system that may be applicable to, for example, the holding company of
the Hotel. It was the Supreme Court of Mexico, on its own motion and
pursuant to its iura novit curia power, 71 that decided to award punitive
damages in this case under Mexican law.
66. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 88, n.128
(citing PIZARRO, supra note 51, at 532).
67. See Natalia Soledad Colarusso, Daños punitivos en el nuevo Código Civil y
Comercial. La Inclusión Que No Fue § 2017 (Editorial Jurídica ed., UTSAPRA 2015),
http://server1.utsupra.com/site1?ID=articulos_utsupra_02A00393369773.
68. See id.
69. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, Voto Concurrente (“Concurring Vote”)
by Jusctice José Ramón Cossío Díaz, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 9-10, nn.5-7.
70. Id. The Concurrent Opinion made reference to Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Cleopatra Haslip Eta Al, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) and Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. 471 (2008),
and cited Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and
Rational?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. U. OF CHI. (1997).
71. Iura novit curia is a legal principle in most civil law jurisdictions, including
Mexico, pursuant to which “the court knows the law”, i.e., that the parties to a legal dispute
do not need to plead or prove the law that applies to their case. See Maria do Carmo
Henríquez Salido, et al., El Principio Procesal Iura Novit Curia En La Jurisprudencia Del
Tribunal Supremo, 64 REVISTA DE LLENGUA I DRET, J. LANGUAGE & L. 1, 3 (2015) (Spain).
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For a common law jurist, what the Supreme Court of Mexico did was
simply to expand the law on torts by adding punitive damages to the scope
of indemnity afforded to victims under some circumstances. In other
words, a common law jurist, from his own perspective, could consider, and
rightly so, that the Supreme Court of Mexico created new rules on tort
damages. The background of this view is that the law of torts in the United
Kingdom and the United Sates has historically been considered a judgemade law—or common law in its narrow sense. 72 Judge-made law is
developed from judgments handed down in courts and is most often used to
make decisions in areas that have not been legislated by the legislative
branch. 73 Judge-made law can be both creation of new rules and
interpretation of existing ones.74 The origins of the tort law particularly
illustrates the creation of law by courts. Tort law, as a part of the common
law, evolved as a reflection of the customs and practices of the local
communities in Anglo-Saxon and Norman regions that were upheld in the
decisions made by the royal courts of England.75
The origins of punitive damages, as part of tort law, are not different.
Sir Henry Brooke reported that punitive damages made their appearance in
England in the 1760s, during a series of cases in which “[i]ndividuals
suffered wrongful interference with their liberty at the hands of public
officials and, in the absence of a code, the English common law judges
awarded non-compensatory damages – or told juries that they might award
such damages—if the defendant’s behaviour seemed bad enough, without
troubling too much to classify these damages under any particular
heading.”76 Similar awards followed over the next 200 years and transited
72. Ronald W. Eades, Attempts To Federalize And Codify Tort Law, 36 TORT & INS.
L.J. 1, 527-28 (2000).
73. William Minor Lile, Judge-Made Law, 15 VA. L. REV. 527-28, 530 (1929).
74. John Barker Waite, Judge-Made Law And The Education Of Lawyers, 30 A.B.A. J.
253, 253 (1944).
75. During the early years of the development of tort law in the United Kingdom and
the United States, it would have been hard to imagine it as anything other than decisions on
a case-by-case basis. In this regard, the ability of tort law to grow and change with the
times arose by virtue of two important factors: tort law is court-created common law, and
tort law is local law. Tort law is not bound by lengthy, complex, unbending legislation,
since courts could review cases and make decisions based upon concepts of justice. As the
tort rules developed, they could be reviewed, revised, overruled, and improved with each
new case. See Eades, supra note 72, at 1-2.
76. Brooke, supra note 6, at 1. One of those cases was Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep.
489, 489 (1763), where Mr. Wilkes’s house was the subject of a search under a general
warrant of arrest, and he brought an action of trespass against the official who executed the
search. His counsel asked for “large and exemplary damages,” since trivial damages would
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to the English colonies including the United States; not only in different
types of intentional and unintentional tort cases including assault, false
imprisonment, defamation, seduction, and malicious prosecution, but also
in cases of trespass to lands, and eventually trespass to goods. Finally, in
1964, the House of Lords decided in Rookes v. Barnard that such damages
were specifically identified as “punitive” or “exemplary.”77
Contrary to the role of common law courts, Mexican courts have no
power to create new rules but only to interpret the provisions of statutes.78
Article 49 of Mexico’s Constitution establishes that the Federal
Government is divided into three branches through which it exercises its
powers: legislative, executive, and judicial. The same provision states that
two or more of these powers may not be performed by one individual
person or corporation, nor may the legislative power alone be assigned to
one individual. 79 This division of powers clause means that the task to
create or derogate the law is exclusively assigned to the legislative branch
of the government80 and that the courts, through which the judicial branch
exercises its own power,81 may not interfere in such a task.82 In addition,
Article 94, paragraph 10, of Mexico’s Constitution explicitly states, “the
law (which obviously means the Congress created law as the only form of
law that may exist according to the division of powers clause in Article 49
above) will set forth the criteria to determine the binding case law

not put a stop to such proceedings. Lord Chief Justice Pratt instructed the jury that
“[d]amages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a
punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of
the detestation of the jury to the action itself.” See Taliadoros, supra note 7, at 258.
77. Rookes v. Barnard, 1 All England Law Reports 367 (1967), cited in VANESSA
WILCOX, Punitive Damages in England, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW
PERSPECTIVES 7 (Helmut Koziol & Vanessa Wilcox eds., 2009); see also Taliadoros, supra
note 7, at 255.
78. ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 38, at 82.
79. Except in cases of war or national security where the Executive power through the
President may temporality limit or suspend the rights and warranties of the population
pursuant to Article 29 of the Mexico Constitution or when the Executive power legislates on
import or export tariffs and taxes in order to govern international trade of goods and the
national economy stability pursuant to Article 131 of the Mexico Constitution.
80. “Codification is thought to be consistent with democratic principles in that it
assigns the task of creating law to legislators”, ZAMORA, ET AL., supra note 38, at 83.
81. Article 94 states that the Federal Judicial Power is exercised through a Supreme
Court, the Electoral Court, the Collegiate and Unitary Circuit Courts and the District Courts.
82. “Norms in a code have legal validity because they have been adopted by the
legislature … In applying code provisions to specific cases, judges are to decide cases in
accordance to the will of the legislature,” ZAMORA, ET AL., supra note 38, at 82.
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(‘jurisprudencia

obligatoria’) issued by Federal Courts on the
of the Constitution and general norms” (emphasis
added).83 The principle that Courts may only interpret legislatively-enacted
laws is also reinforced by the due process clause in Article 14 of Mexico’s
Constitution that provides that “in any civil proceedings, the final decision
shall be in accordance with the text or judicial INTERPRETATION of the
law” (emphasis added). In both cases, Mexico’s Constitution clearly
addresses the interpretation rather than the creation of the law. 84 This
division of powers maxim has also been adopted by the local Constitutions
of 32 Mexican states, which means that local state courts are also limited in
their judicial roles to only interpret local laws.
The above explains why the Supreme Court of Mexico could not have
created a new law in the way common law courts have been doing for
many centuries, with regard to tort law and punitive damages. In its goal to
redesign the compensation rules for victims in tort cases, the Supreme
Court of Mexico had recently decided the unconstitutionality of some
federal statutory provisions, which, for example, placed a cap on the
compensation of damages. 85 But with regard to punitive damages, its
seems that the Supreme Court of Mexico had no choice but to perform the
transplantation of a foreign legal institution into a system of tort indemnity
that has been, historically, compensatory in nature. Did the Supreme Court
of Mexico breach the separation of powers clause in Article 49 of Mexico’s
Constitution with the application of punitive damages? The answer may be
no. The Supreme Court did not incorporate punitive damages as a distinct
type of damages, independent from compensatory damages.
The
interpretative role of courts in many civil law jurisdictions forced the
Supreme Court of Mexico to simply construe that punitive damages were
part of the compensation afforded by the statutory law under the head of
moral damages. In Section Five of this article, we submit that this will
represent a problem for the proper functioning of punitive damages in
Mexico.
INTERPRETATION

83. Id. at 84: “In a civil law country such as Mexico, the creation of binding judicial
precedent, not being part of the legal tradition, must be established by legislation.”
84. Id. at 82: “Self-contained codes are expected to prevent judges and others from
creating rules that would contradict the spirit of the code.”
85. See Supreme Court of Justice, First Chamber, Amparo Directo 1068/2011, Oct. 19,
2011. In the case at hand, Article 62 of the Civil Aviation Law provides that the indemnity
for the damages incurred by passengers may not be three times higher than what is
stipulated in Articles 500-502 of the Mexico Federal Labor Law, which set the rules on the
amount of compensation that employers are required to pay employees for accidents that
take place in the context and during their labor activities.
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In spite of the whether the Supreme Court’s move was too subtle to be
considered the result of pure interpretation of statutory law rather than the
breach of the division of power clause in Mexico’s Constitution, the result
is the adoption a foreign legal notion into Mexico’s legal system.
Scholarship has proposed different metaphors and concepts to describe and
explain the effects of these adoption phenomena, the most known being
legal transplants or transplantations. Explained for the first time in 1974 by
Alan Watson, in his work Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative
Law,86 legal transplant is the phenomenon of “moving a rule... from one
country to another.” 87 In fact, this represents one of the most common
means of legal change because legal actors tend to borrow what is needed
from other legal systems to solve issues or fill gaps in the local legal
system in a pursuit to create different or better laws.88 Watson compared
legal transplants to the transplants of human organs, suggesting that a
successful legal transplant will “become part of that body just as the rule or
institution would have continued to develop in its parent system,” and grow
in its new body.89 This medical metaphor of legal transplants refers to the
surgical understanding of transplant and is the most common metaphor.90
It compares the process of moving the law from one place to another to the
search for a compatible donor so as to provide hope to other systems of the
world community. 91 Like a medical transplant, the success of the legal
transplant depends on making the host system believe that the adopted rule
already belonged to it. In the same line of thought, a legal transplant may
fail because of the incompatibility of the host legal system’s own condition
with the inherent features of the rule received.92
The metaphor of medical transplants has its own limits in explaining
what actually happens when a rule is moved from one legal system to
86. Watson was not the first one to use the concept of legal transplant. Legal historian
Frederik Parker Walton, in his article “The Historical School of Jurisprudence and
Transplantations of Law,” used the concept of “legal transplantation” in a critique to the
then popular views of the historical school of jurisprudence. Walton, like Watson but a half
century later, pointed to the regularity of occurrences of transplantation of law. See F. P.
Walton, The Historical School of Jurisprudence and Transplantations of Law, 9 J. COMP.
LEGIS. & INT’L L. 183, 183 (1927).
87. Id. at 21.
88. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L.J. 1, 2
(1974); BEATA KVIATEK, EXPLAINING LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: TRANSPLANTATION OF EU LAW
INTO CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE 31 (Wolf Legal Publishers 2015).
89. WATSON, supra note 15, at 27.
90. Kahn-Freund, supra note 88, at 5-6; KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 63.
91. KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 63.
92. Id.
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another. As noted by one scholar, legal transplantations occurred not
because of the contrasts between healthy and ailing legal systems, but
because of the wider demand by some actors of a legal system that
promotes change in their society.93 In this regard, some assert that different
metaphors, such as the botanical one, may be more suitable than the
medical metaphor to illustrate what Watson had in mind. The transplants
of plant species, for example, show that seeds may be planted and
engrafted on foreign soil, where they wilt, vegetate or prosper.94 Hans W.
Baade explains that a successfully transplanted crop flourishes in both the
original and the new environment.95 Although there may be differences of
color, size, or demand in the fruits of the transplanted seeds, the original
land will still have its own crops, while the medical metaphor assumes that
the donated organ is removed from the donor system.96 Besides, in the
botanical metaphor, there is always space for the adaptation or alteration in
the recipient system—for example by installing greenhouses over the
recipient land to achieve the proper temperature or humidity for successful
growth—whereas the medical metaphor suggests that the recipient body
will not change in essence.97
Other alternative concepts proposed to depict the legal transfer of
one rule from one place to another.98 The proponents of these alternatives
to explain the same legal phenomena often consider that the original notion
of legal transplants is imperfect because of the lack of flexibility in
assuming that the outcome of legal transplantation is either a success or a
failure, and its static meaning as opposed to the dynamic concepts that they
advance.99 Some see legal transplantation as the process of circulation of
legal ideas because it refers to movement and continual flow of legal
concepts and paradigms.100 Others focus on the transformations that legal

93. Id. at 64.
94. Id. (citing Hans W. Baade, Transplants of Laws and of Lawyers, JUSTICE IN
PARTICULAR: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR P. J. KOZYRIS 2 (Phaedon J. Kozyris
ed., 2007)).
95. Id.
96. KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 64.
97. Id. at 65.
98. Alternative terminology includes collective colonization, legal irritants, layeredlaw, hyphenated-law, and competition systems. Images such as contamination, inoculation,
irritation, reception, imposed reception, concerted parallel development, and transposition.
See Esin Örücü, Law as Transposition, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 205, 207 (2002).
99. KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 65.
100. Edward M. Wise, The Transplant of Legal Patterns, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 2 (1990).
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ideas undergo when adopting a rule into a different legal system,101 or on
the irritation and unexpected events that are triggered when one foreign
rule is imposed on a domestic legal culture. 102 Finally, some authors
proposed to call it “legal diffusion,” because a lot of legal borrowing is
voluntary,103 or legal transposition as it is used in music where each note
takes the same relative place on the scales; the transposition is done to suit
the particular instrument or voice range of the singer.104
The references to the American law on punitive damages in the
February 2014 decision and its two Concurrent Opinions, show that what
the Supreme Court of Mexico did was to move a rule that exists in the
United States legal system to the Mexican one. We favor the idea that this
move should be understood through the lenses of the botanical metaphor of
legal transplants rather than the medical one. The Supreme Court of
Mexico’s intention was to plant the seeds of punitive damages into the
Mexican soil, hoping to see them flourish there, just as they do in their
original environment. Since the beginning, however, there have been
doubts about whether the Mexican legal system was the proper terrain for
growth of punitive damages. In the Concurrent Opinion issued by Justice
Pardo Rebolledo, he asserts that if the Supreme Court of Mexico intended
to import punitive damages from the United States, it needed to develop
further its application parameters and distinguish them from the notion of
“fair indemnity” because their goal is to punish rather than to
compensate. 105 In this regard, the botanical metaphor suits this case
because of the implied possibility to adapt the recipient system; as we
anticipate should happen in Section Six, in light of the current problematic
situation we describe in Section Five.
With regard to the alternative metaphors, we consider them as useful
supplements to the botanical metaphor of legal transplants. At the end of
the day, the Supreme Court of Mexico would not have come up with the
idea of enlarging the scope of damages indemnity but for the circulation of
101. Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants To Legal Translations: The
Globalization Of Plea Bargaining And The Americanization Thesis In Criminal Procedure,
45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2004).
102. In other words, post-transplantation effects “unleash an evolutionary dynamic in
which the external rules meaning will be reconstructed and the internal context will undergo
fundamental change.” See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or
How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 12 (1998).
103. KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 67.
104. Örücü, supra note 98, at 207.
105. Supreme Court of Mexico, Voto Concurrente by Justice Jorge Mario Pardo
Rebolledo, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 4.
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America legal ideas and paradigms that constantly flow from north to
south.106 We also agree that the result of legal transplants is not necessarily
a failure nor a success but that adoption of a legal institution undergoes a
transformation and triggers different post-transplantation effects, some of
which are more desirable than the others. The insertion of the punitive
damages into the Mexican legal system was voluntary. One could even say
that the Supreme Court of Mexico was aware of the fact that the Mexican
legal system, as a musical instrument, did not have the same scale of notes
to apply punitive damages as a distinct type of damages to the
compensatory ones and still decided to transpose them. Be that as it may,
the legal transplant occurred because the Supreme Court of Mexico sought
to implement changes in the law of damages that will as a consequence
take the Mexican society toward a different direction. The next step is to
determine what the chances of success in the receptor system are. In the
next section, we revisit the criteria proposed by prominent comparativists
to forecast the results of transplanted legal rules.
4.

The Criteria to Assess a Legal Transplant’s Effectiveness

The simple act of borrowing a legal rule is a phenomenon with
important social implications. Alan Watson asserts that there are four
aspects of legal transplants, which are important to explain why reception
of foreign law happens.107 First, a jurist borrows a legal rule when such is
economically efficient. This aspect is called practical utility; which
appeals to those who have the task of legislating law because of the hard
labor of thinking that it saves.108 The second aspect is chance. Watson
suggests that the fact that a specific foreign rule is incorporated into a host
106. Geopolitical elements and economic integration have always played a role in
Mexico’s adoption of legal institutions from the United States, in particular in the field of
trade law. See Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in
the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 L. & POL’Y IN INT’L BUS. 391, 392 ff
(1993). Some private law legal institutions in Mexico, such as the trust (fideicomiso), came
from the United States too. The first Mexican Trust provisions were enacted in 1924 and
followed closely the Uniform Fiduciaries Act enacted in the United States in 1922. See
CARLOS FELIPE DÁVALOS MEJÍA, TÍTULOS Y OPERACIONES DE CRÉDITO 541 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2012). But the influence of United States Law is also clear in Mexican Constitutional
Law. See generally WATSON SMITH, Influences from the United States on the Mexican
Constitution of 1824, 4 ARIZONA AND THE WEST (1962).
107. Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335, 355 (1996).
108. Id.; C. J. MILHAUPT & K. PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES
REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD 210
(Univ. of Chi. Press 2008).
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system responds to unexpected circumstances that make the materials or
information about foreign law available at a particular time in the host
system.109 The third aspect that leads to reception of the law is difficulty of
clear sight or misunderstanding of the foreign legal institution which is
adopted. 110 This is similar to the aspect of chance; the foreign law is
believed to be useful to the receptor system because it is highly regarded
but its implementation is the result of a misunderstanding. 111 Finally,
Watson explains that borrowing a rule from a foreign legal system often
reflects the “need for authority” to justify the adoption of a solution that
seems to be optimal for the host system.112
Watson’s aspects of reception of law describe the motivations and
circumstances that lead to borrowing a legal rule. The adoption of punitive
damages in Mexico may respond to similar circumstances. The Supreme
Court of Mexico referred to the American notion of punitive damages,
which has developed its contours and purpose through legal scholarship
and case law over the years.113 Its practical utility was thus an important
aspect for the Court. Chance also played its own role. American legal
materials and ideas were available to the Supreme Court Justices when
drafting the decision. 114 In addition, the transplant of punitive damages
into Mexico may not have happened but for the difficulty of clear sight of
the Supreme Court regarding the whole legal framework of damages
indemnity in the common law. Should the Court have had a clear
understanding of the distinctive (punitive) nature that this type of damages
has vis-à-vis compensatory damages, it may not have adopted them. 115
109. Watson, supra note 107, at 340 (1996).
110. Id. at 341-45.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 345-49.
113. See Supreme Court of Mexico, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 87, nn.13, and 12526; Voto Concurrente by Justice José Ramón Cossío Díaz, supra note 3, at 9-10, nn.5-7;
Voto Concurrente by Justice Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo, supra note 3, at 4.
114. The Supreme Court of Mexico had accessed to the following American journal
articles (somehow old for the case): Owen, Punitive damages in products liability litigation,
supra note 65; Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, supra note 65; Morgan,
supra note 65, at, 279; and O’Donnell, supra note 65, at 803. See Supreme Court of Mexico,
A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 87, nn.125-26. Justice José Ramón Cossío Díaz had also
cited to the following U.S. Supreme Court cases: Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v.
Cleopatra Haslip Eta Al, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) and Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
See Voto Concurrente by Justice José Ramón Cossío Díaz, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at
13-14, nn.5-7.
115. Justice Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo was the only Justice from the Supreme Court
of Mexico that suspected that there may be a misunderstanding about the function of
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Finally, it was not a coincidence that the Supreme Court cited American
scholars, as well as the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights,116 or a renowned civil law scholar such as Pizarro.117 The Supreme
Court of Mexico’s choice of references reflects a need for authority,
although we consider that in that case, the Court also misunderstood their
real meaning (see Section 5.3 below).
The motivation or reason for a legal transplant is important because it
affects the conduct of the legal community that subsequently interprets and
enforces the law and this in turn affects the effectiveness of the legal
transplant in the long term.118 However, Watson’s aspects are insufficient
to determine the extent to which the transplant of a foreign law may be
successful. Comparatists agree that legal transplants are not mechanical
processes, and that there is a chance of rejection.119 In this regard, scholars
have submitted that certain conditions are necessary for optimal legal
transplantation.120 In this section, we revisit the criteria suggested by some
leading works in this field.121 The purpose of this review is to frame our
analysis about the forecasted results in the transplant of punitive damages
into the Mexican legal system.
Otto Kahn-Freund asserted that the merits of the imported law should
not be evaluated in isolation; its impact on the broader legal system must
be reviewed, including its institutional compatibility. 122 He argues that
since L’Esprit de Lois, 123 Montesquieu had already warned us that the
private and public laws of each nation must be unique for the people for
which they were created and, thus, it would be a great coincidence that the
laws of one nation could also work for another.124 Under this view, legal
punitive damages, which is different to the deterrence effect that compensatory damages
could also have. See Voto Concurrente by Justice Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo, A.D.
30/2013, supra note 3, at 4.
116. Supreme Court of Mexico, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 86, n.121 (citing Cantoral
Benavides vs. Perú, supra note 61, ¶ 53).
117. Id. at 88, n.128 (citing PIZARRO, supra note 51, at 532).
118. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 108, at 210.
119. See KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 72; Kahn-Freund, supra note 88, at 7.
120. KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 69.
121. These works are the following: Kahn-Freund, THE MODERN LAW JOURNAL (1974);
MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 108; Örücü, supra note 98; and Daniel Berkowitz et al.,
The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003).
122. Kahn-Freund, supra note 88, at 27.
123. For further reading about this key illustration times’ work, see MONTESQUIEU, DE
L'ESPRIT DES LOIS (Culture Commune 2013).
124. Kahn-Freund, supra note 88, at 6.
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transplants could only be successful if the geography, demography,
ethnicity, economy, society and political system of the donor country were
alike in the recipient country.125 He reckoned, however, that most of these
elements, except for the political and social fit, have lost their importance
as a key factor for successful transplantation.126 He submited that (already
in the 1970s) industrialization, urbanization, and development of
communications have greatly reduced the obstacles for transplantation,
making the social, economic and environmental conditions more alike in
most nations.127 What remains important for successful legal transplants is
to establish compatibility between the host legal system and the sociopolitical structure of the donor state.128 Accordingly, the degree to which a
rule, say on tort liability, can be transplanted depends on “how closely is
[the recipient system] linked with the foreign power structure.” 129 The
power structure may be “expressed in the distribution of formal
constitutional functions or in the influence of those social groups which in
each democratic state play a decisive role in the law making or decision
making process.” 130 Kahn-Freund gives one interesting example that
shows how variations in the organization of power between one country
and another frustrate the transfer of legal institutions. In the early
nineteenth century Germany and France attempted to introduced the jury in
civil proceedings but failed because the legal profession; both lawyers and
judges, rejected it. 131 It did not fit with the accustomed distribution of
power between the courts and the bar; expressed in the inquisitorial trial
style of these jurisdictions.132 One may argue that this example shows the
importance of the legal culture fit rather than the compatibility with the
power structure. But Otto Kahn-Freund shows that in the past, similarly
diverging rules have been adopted thanks to their acceptance by the power
structure. In particular, the mixed labor courts of of England, which solve
disputes between employers and employees, came from France in 1964,
and were accepted there irrespective of the royal courts’ tradition.133

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 17-18.
Id.
Id. at 18.
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In contrast, Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard suggest that a legal
transplant is effective if there is demand for the adopted law in the host
system.134 The adopted rule should be able to be used in practice and the
legal actors responsible for developing the law need also to be responsive
to this demand.135 Demand will usually take place where the legal actors in
the host country are familiar with the basic legal principles of the
transplanted law or adaptation to the local conditions occurs. 136 Where
these conditions are present the transplanted rule will function just as
effectively as in its country of origin country. However, when the host
legal system does not share the same basic legal principles of, or its
population is not familiar with the transplanted law, the demand for using it
will be weak.137 Countries that receive the foreign legal concepts in this
fashion suffer from the “transplant effect,” i.e. the mismatch between
preexisting conditions and institutions and the transplanted law, which
weakens its effectiveness.138
In a different work, Milhaupt and Pistor challenge the assumption that
legal transplants will fail if they do not fit with the culture of the recipient
state. Instead, they argue that demand for the transplanted law alone, and
the process by which it is incorporated into the host country’s institutional
structure is the key factor for determining how and whether the transplant
will work.139 With regard to the need of demand in the transplantation of a
protective legal rule [such as punitive damages] from a decentralized legal
system [like the United States in the field of tort law claims]140 to a more
centralized system [like Mexico],141 the relevant issue is whether there are

134. Berkowitz et al., supra note 121, at 167.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 168.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 171.
139. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 108, at 6: “that the nature of legal demand for the
transplanted law and the process by which it is incorporated into the host country's
institutional structure significantly affect whether and how the transplant will function.”
140. Decentralized centralized systems allocate law-making and law enforcement
activities to multiple agents, including private parties who may exercise extensive rights to
initiate law enforcement and to participate in law-making processes. See id. In the United
States citizen are in charge of redressing the consequences of tortious conducts before the
courts, initiating law enforcement by their own. See ZAMORA, ET AL., supra note 38, at 521.
141. Centralized systems typically vest law-making powers in the legislative or the
executive branch and prefer centralized law enforcement mechanisms of the state. See
MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 108, at 6. In Mexico, individuals are less litigious; the
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mechanisms in place to enforce the new rule.142 Do plaintiffs and lawyers
have incentives to bring suits that make use of the new rule? Are judges
familiar with the underlying concept or doctrine? Are they inclined to side
with the normative implications of the legal change? Demand sufficient to
motivate this integrative activity by the local legal community is more
likely to exist if the transplanted rule complements the political economy of
the host country. 143 Milhaupt and Pistor call this the complementarity
between the transplant and the political economy “macro-fit.” What is
important is whether the foreign legal rule responds to an actual legal gap
in the host country’s institutional structure that is not filled by other
mechanisms and whether the rule is likely to be used.144 Accordingly, the
effectiveness of legal transplants will vary depending on how well the new
rules adapt to local circumstances.145 One of these adaptations is from the
legal actors themselves: lawyers and judges must gain familiarity with the
transplanted rule. Further adaptation may involve removing procedural
obstacles to its enforcement in the host legal system and, in general, create
the proper environment and incentives for applying the new law. 146 In
conclusion, the existence of demand for the foreign rule also depends on
the extent to which the changes are aligned with the conduct of local
actors, including lawyers, judges, and bureaucrats in applying and
enforcing the transplanted law.
In addition, Esin Örücü stated that “tuning [of the transposed laws] that
takes place after transposition by the appropriate actors of the recipient
legal system is the key to success.”147 According to this author, voluntary
transplants increase their own receptivity when adjustments are made to
foreign legal rule. 148 In this regard, the way in which a foreign rule is
transplanted is a more important determinant of success than the source of
supply and affinity of the systems involved. 149
For successful

Executive power is often called to negotiate the compensation for victims of tortious
conducts by big corporations. See ZAMORA, ET AL., supra note 38, at 521.
142. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 108, at 210.
143. Id. at 210-11.
144. Id.
145. KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 72.
146. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 108, at 211.
147. Örücü, supra note 98, at 207.
148. Id. at 208.
149. Id. In the same line, Berkowitz, et al., supra note 121, at 169: “provide statistical
evidence showing that the "transplant effect" is a more important predictor of effective legal
institutions than the supply of a particular family.”
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transposition, tuning should be made by the host system and performed at
all levels, including judges and legal educators. 150 Örücü also explained
that fine-tuning should not necessarily result in likeliness; rather harmony
is what is needed for successful transposition.151 The transfer of a legal
rule and its reception will always be confronted by the idiosyncrasies of the
legal community in the host system and face external resistance. In fact,
legal transplants can occurred between systems with socio-cultural and
legal affinity, between systems with social and cultural similarity but legal
cultural differences, and between systems that are both socio-culturally and
legal culturally different. 152
In all these scenarios, successful
transplantations may take time so that the local actors can fine-tune the
foreign law. 153 In some cases, such as in those systems that are socio
and/or legal culturally alike, transposition can happen very smoothly with
the help of fine-tuning, whereas other times, in particular but not
necessarily between socio and legal culturally very different systems,
transposition is the result of a strong push from a ruling elite or the legal
profession.154 Örücü refers to Turkey as an example where transposition of
law has been one between socio-culturally and legal-culturally diverse
societies. The modern Turkish private law is the result of transposing rules
mainly from France, Germany and Switzerland. 155 Turkey reflects a
sensitive tuning of law transposition in a country where some would claim
dissimilar socio and legal cultures would prevent the transplant of the
above-referred European laws. 156 One of the factors that facilitated
transposition in this case was, however, the import of the complete legal
structure and not just the isolated rules, which made the Turkish private
law look very similar to the Swiss and German laws.157 In spite of this,
successful transposition was only possible because the divergent and
unintended consequences of the massive legal transplant that Turkey
underwent since the beginning of the nineteenth century, has been adjusted,
tuned, and homogenized over time.158 This was possible due to the support
150. Örücü, supra note 98, at 208.
151. Id. at 211.
152. Id. at 212-13.
153. KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 73.
154. Örücü, supra note 98, at 212.
155. However, Berkowitz et al. characterizes Turkey as an unreceptive transplant.
Berkowitz et al., supra note 121, at 199.
156. Örücü, supra note 98, at 215-16.
157. Id. at 216.
158. Id.
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of educational institutions, proactive judges, and creative scholars in a
Muslim country where there are always fears that the social and cultural
systems and the imported legal system will not easily agree.159
5.

The Forecasted Results of the Transplantation of Punitive Damages In
Mexico

We agree with the proposition that when a rule is borrowed from a
foreign legal system, it becomes a different rule in the host legal system.
The transplanted law inevitably is tropicalized by the local conditions,
interpretation, and application by the local actors. In this regard,
measuring the results of a legal transplant under the criteria reviewed in the
last section may be superfluous unless we determine, first, whether the
foreign law is comparable to the adopted law itself. To accomplish the
determination of whether punitive damages under the American legal
system are comparable to those just transplanted into Mexico, we will use
the functional method in comparative law. This methodology has many
functions.160 One of them is to perform tertium comparationis: legal and
non-legal rules, even doctrinally different ones, are comparable if they are
functionally equivalent because they endeavor to accomplish or have the
same function in their respective societies.161
A different function of the functional method of comparative law is
that functionality can serve as an evaluative criterion. In that case,
comparative law works as a criterion to determine which legal rule is
better—American or Mexican punitive damages—because under the

159. Id.
160. Michaels identifies seven functions of the Functional Method of Comparative Law:
(1) the epistemological function of understanding legal rules and institutions, (2) the
comparative function of achieving comparability, (3) the presumptive function of
emphasizing similarity, (4) the formalizing function of system building, (5) the evaluative
function of determining the better law, (6) the universalizing function of preparing legal
unification, and (7) the critical function of providing tools for the critique of law. See Ralf
Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, OXFD. HANDBOOK OF COMP. L. 342,
363 (2006).
161. Efstathios K. Banakas, Some Thoughts on the Method of Comparative Law: The
Concept of Law Revisited, 67 RSP: ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE /
ARCHIVES FOR PHIL. OF L. & SOC. PHIL. 289, 289 (1981); Michaels, supra note 160, 342; But
see Julie De-Coninck, The Functional Method of Comparative Law: "Quo Vadis"?, RABELS
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHE UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT / RABEL J. COMP. &
INT’L PRIV. L. 323 (2010).
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functional method, “the better of several laws is that which fulfils its
function better than the others.”162
This section will be divided as follows. In Subsection 5.1, we will
perform a tertium comparationis between American and Mexican punitive
damages in order to determine whether these are similar legal institutions
and thus comparable ones. In Subsection 5.2, we will assess how sociopolitical differences of the receptor legal system, identified by KahnFreund as an important factor for successful legal transplants, may affect
the correct transplantation of the American notion of punitive damages in
Mexico. In Subsection 5.3, we will establish how much of Milhaupt and
Pistor’s demand for the transplanted law there is in Mexican society and
how well punitive damages have been incorporated into Mexico’s legal
structure to meet such demand. And finally in Subsection 5.4, we will
evaluate whether Mexico’s punitive damages are as good as the American
punitive damages in accomplishing their function in the Mexican and
American societies, respectively.
5.1

Assessing Comparability of Punitive Damages in the United States
and Mexico

Under the functional method of comparative law, two rules are
comparable if they endeavor to accomplish or have the same function in
their respective societies.163 The function of a rule is not defined by the
intended purpose assigned by the legislature or the dogmatic reflections
attached to it, but on the actual problem it endeavors to address or
effectively tackles.164 The more specific the problem is, the less likely it is
that there are rules in two or more systems whose function is the same.165
But comparatists who do not find universality of a problem because of its
high degree of specificity can always step down one level to compare those
general needs shared by most societies from which the specific problem
derives.166 For example, we may agree that most societies have the need to
solve the problems (damages) caused by tortious conducts and that tort law
is there to fulfil this need. This is a universal problem. But from there
162. Michaels, supra note 160, at 342.
163. Banakas, supra note 161, at 289; Michaels, supra note 160, at 342; but see DeConinck, supra note 161, at 345, suggesting that empirically substantiated behavioral
patterns should be the standard of comparison, so that legal comparatists can go beyond the
reliance on mere constructed problems as a starting point for their inquiries.
164. Michaels, supra note 160, at 367.
165. Banakas, supra note 161, at 291.
166. Michaels, supra note 160, at 368.
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other specific needs derive and, thus, rules may be in place to fulfil them.
Tort law may be there to provide compensation for the harm suffered by
victims of wrongful conducts in most societies, but some societies may
have the additional need to send clear signals of deterrence to avoid similar
conducts in the future.
In addition, functional equivalents may not be known until they appear
in the compared legal system.167 Late appearance may reflect a lack of
problem or necessity to be solved in the past or a voluntary or negligent
omission by the legal actors of the legal system concerned. But the
appearance of new rules allows the comparatist to identify the underlying
problem and to recognize their function. Still, how do we know that the
function of damages indemnity is to deter wrongdoings or to punish, and
not to compensate or to effectuate certain societal values, or all of the
above? 168 At the end of the day, “similarity of results to certain fact
situation, regardless of the difference in doctrine, strongly suggest that the
respective legal institutions can be different (but functionally equivalent)
responses to a similar problem.”169
In light of the above, let us turn to the functions that punitive
damages seek to accomplish in the American legal system. Owen, the
same scholar cited by the Supreme Court of Mexico when it first
introduced the concept of punitive damages in its decision,170 noted that
most courts in the United States refer to “punishment” and “deterrence” as
rationales for such damages. 171 In addition, Section 908(1) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts of 1979 states: “Punitive damages are
damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and
others like him from similar conduct in the future.”
In this line of thought, we may assert that the award of punitive
damages serves the priority function of punishing tortious conducts. That
function is difficult to understand since a modern legal system should not

167. Id. at 369.
168. Id. at 368.
169. Id. at 369.
170. Supreme Court of Mexico, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at. 87, nn.125-26 (citing
Owen, Punitive damages in products liability litigation, supra note 65).
171. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform,
39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 373 (1994). See also Momioka Hironari, Punitive Damages Revisited:
A Statistical Analysis Of How Federal Circuit Courts Decide The Constitutionality of Such
Awards, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 385 (2017) (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 19 (1991)).

232

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:1

be based on private revenge. However, punishment serves two subfunctions that are easier to contextualize in modern societies, one of which
is retribution. As Owen explains, “[it] is entirely appropriate for the law to
allow a person injured by the wanton misconduct of another to vent his
outrage by extracting from the wrongdoer a judicial fine.”172 In this case,
the function of punitive damages serves the protection of societal values of
freedom and equality.173 As in the crime of theft, punishment in tort claims
serves to restore the equality of the victim in relation to the tortfeasor by
diminishing the extra worth and freedom held illicitly by the latter that was
stolen from the victim.174 The other sub-function derived from punishment
is law enforcement. As we mentioned before, punitive damages are often
criticized because the plaintiff receives more windfall than the
compensation to her actual loss (see Section One above). However, this
criticism ignores that the very possibility of a windfall motivates victims
who are reluctant to bring their claims against big corporations and
therefore assists in enforcing the rules of law.175 Accordingly, the profits
from punishment have a vital procedural function of law enforcement that
is the basis for achieving other functions.176
In addition, punitive damages in the United States serve the function of
avoiding future damages by deterring the tortfeasor and anyone under
similar circumstances from behaving in similar fashion. 177 But this
function only works well in deterring gross misconduct when the law
enforcers regularly catch and punish those that flagrantly infringe the rights
of the other, and when potential offenders understand that the law censures
and punishes their contemplated misbehavior. 178 Although it may be
common knowledge that misconduct often goes undetected and
unpunished, punitive damages serve to deter similar conduct by
sensationalizing and making public the apprehension and punishment of
tortfeasors. 179 This, in turn, serves the sub-function of in educating the
offenders and the society in general because it confirms the existence of
legally protected rights and interests belong to the plaintiff and the
172. See Owen, supra note 65, at 375.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 376.
175. Id. at 380.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 377; Brooke, supra note 6, at 1; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 6, at 394;
Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 6, at 262, citing Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2615.
178. Owen, supra note 65, at 377.
179. Id.
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corresponding condemnation that society attaches to its flagrant invitation
by the kind of gross misconduct of the defendant. 180 Since punitive
damages express society’s disapproval of a conduct, we may say that
punitive damages serve the function of effectuating the societal value of
maintaining moral and legal standards of conduct.181
Let us turn to the functions that punitive damages have or endeavor to
accomplish in Mexico’s legal system. First, we must acknowledge that it
has been four years since the Supreme Court of Mexico’ decision, there
have been neither cases reported from other Mexican courts, nor
scholarship that may contribute to the understanding of punitive damages
in Mexico.182 All that has been stated, mainly by lawyers in the form of
law firm notes or bulletins, is that the Supreme Court of Mexico awarded
punitive damages for the first time in February 2014, changing the legal
landscape for companies and victims in Mexico.183 That being said, there
are elements in the February 26, 2014 decision that can help us establish
the functions that punitive damages pursue in Mexico. In particular, the
Supreme Court of Mexico expressly stated that punitive damages had the
function of punishing and deterring the defendant and others in general
from similar tortious conduct.184 The reference to American scholars in
that specific passage of the decision confirms that that the Supreme Court
of Mexico had in mind a similar understanding of the function that punitive

180. Id. at 374.
181. Sharkey, supra note 9, at 352; Owen, supra note 65, at 375.
182. Currently, there is only a recent Supreme Court of Mexico’s decision where it was
stated that punitive damages are part of moral damages but they were not awarded in that
case and no further guidelines on this type of damages indemnity were provided with.
See Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, 26 February 2014, Amparo Directo
593/2015, ¶ 140, http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?
Asunto ID=176854.
183. See e.g., Alejandro Osuna Gonzalez, Mexican Supreme Court Recognizes Punitive
Damages and Orders Mayan Palace To Pay $2.4 Million Dollars In a Wrongful Death
Case, http://www.osunalegal.com/articles/punitivedamagesmexico (last visited Oct. 23,
2018); Salvador Fonseca-Gonzalez & Antonio Curiel Valtierra, The New Concept of
Punitive Damages In Mexico, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=73e79ae29196-496a-ad29-ca267f2fda37 (last visited Oct. 23, 2018); Armando Quintana Freg, Theory
of Punitive Damages in Mexico, http://ccn-law.com/ccn-mexico-report/theory-of-punitivedamages-in-mexico-by-armando-quintana-freg/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
184. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 87,
nn.125-26.
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damages play in the United States.185 In addition, the Supreme Court also
stated that punitive damages were part of the right to adequate
compensation under the Mexican Constitution and the Inter-American
Convention of Human Rights.186 Although it mixed concepts pertaining to
different legal traditions, the Supreme Court of Mexico concluded that “the
amount of indemnity shall accomplish its purpose to compensate but also
to dissuade”187 giving to moral damages. This is for the purpose of not
only the function of deterring, but also of compensating. Despite the clear
line drawn between compensatory damages and punitive damages in the
United States, some scholars have agreed that punitive damages may also
serve the incidental function of compensating the victim.188
Moreover, the facts that led to this case are descriptive of the type of
gross misconducts that punitive damages also address and discourage in the
United States. The Hotel in the Mexican case was grossly negligent in
providing first aid to the victim, since it did not have the emergency
protocols required and it breached the law by failing to maintain the
artificial lake’s equipment in proper conditions. Its careless conduct not
only prevented the victim from receiving medical care in time, but also
caused mortification to the victim’s friends and family, and hid crucial
information about the victim’s death (see Subsection 2.1 above). Punitive
damages have been awarded against other hotels in the United States for
gross misconduct that led to less severe injuries.189 Defendants who failed

185. Id. The Supreme Court of Mexico relied on the following American journal articles
(somehow old for the case): Owen, supra note 65; Morgan, supra note 61, at 279; and
O'Donnell, supra note 61.
186. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 87-88.
187. Id. at 100.
188. Owen, supra note 65, at 378-79.
189. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 1199 (7th Cir. Oct. 21, 2003):
In 2000, defendant’s clerks began issuing refunds to customers who complained about ticks
and biting bugs in hotel rooms. The hotel’s manager then recommended closing the
establishment while every room was sprayed, but a supervisor refused. The hotel continued
to rent out rooms and moved guests who complained. Judge Posner who decided the appeal
of this case wrote of one guests who was moved to three rooms to get away from bedbugs.
With the problem reaching “farcical proportions,” the hotel desk clerks were told to call the
bedbugs “ticks” on the theory that customers would be less alarmed, as Judge Posner noted.
Judge Posner also noted that the hotel put rooms on “Do not rent, bugs in room” status but
then rented them anyway. Two guests brought a suit alleging wanton and willful conduct,
and asked for compensatory and punitive damages. The defendant hotel claimed that its
conduct was, at most, negligent, and that punitive damages were not warranted. The jury
awarded compensatory damages of approximately $5,000 and punitive damages of
$186,000 per plaintiff.
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to test the safety of their products and comply with all applicable standards
and regulations, evincing a lack of care or indifference as to the safety of
its customers have also been condemned with punitive damages in the
United States.190
In light of the above, the punitive damages transplanted in Mexico are
comparable (yet still undeveloped) to those applied in the United States.
Despite the dogmatic mistake that the Supreme Court of Mexico
committed by considering punitive damages as part of moral damages,
which nature is compensatory (see Subsection 5.3 below), the functions
that they intend to serve are similar. We should now determine how well
punitive damages will function in Mexico.
5.2

Socio-political Differences of the Receptor Legal System as an
Obstacle for Successful Transplantation

Kahn-Freund suggests that a legal transplant increases its chances of
success if the socio-political structure of the donor state and the host
system are compatible (see Section Four above).191 Under this view, the
degree of acceptance of punitive damages depends on how closely
connected the power structures of Mexico and the United States are.192 The
power structure may be “expressed in the distribution of formal
constitutional functions or in the influence of those social groups which in
each democratic state play a decisive role in the law making or decision
making process.” 193 Against this background, the transplant of punitive
damages in Mexico will not succeed unless the Supreme Court gets the
firm support of the federal and state legislatures. In spite of the act that the
Supreme Court of Mexico has been trying to modernize the law on
damages, Mexico is a civil law jurisdiction where the exclusive power to
create the law is constitutionally allocated to the legislative branch. This
differs from the basic power structure in the United States where courts are
empowered to create new rules on tort matters unless prevented by
legislation (see Section 3 above). Now that punitive damages are part of
190. See e.g., Aleo v. SLB Toys USA, Inc., Case No. SJC 11294 (MA Sup. Jud. Ct. Sep.
13, 2013): A young woman fractured two cervical vertebrae when she slid her head first
down a defectively inflatable swimming pool, and stuck her head against the concrete deck
of the pool when the bottom of the slide collapsed. The jury found that the seller Toys “R”
Us liable for negligence, breach of warranty, and wrongful death, and awarded
compensatory damages in the amount of $2,640,000. The jury also found Toys “R” Us
grossly negligent and awarded punitive damages in the amount of $18,000,000.
191. Kahn-Freund, supra note 88, at 27.
192. Id. at 18.
193. Id.

236

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:1

the indemnity afforded under the head of moral damages, the support of the
legislative branch may come in two forms. First, the federal and state
legislatures may back up the interpretation of the Supreme Court of Mexico
from any pressure by lobby groups demanding the enactment of legislation
to reverse the Court’s ruling.194 Second, the Federal and State legislatures
may enact better designed rules on punitive damages following the
conclusions of comparative law studies like this one (see Subsection 5.3
below).
In addition, other legal actors in Mexico’s power structure must also
support the ruling of the Supreme Court of Mexico. It is worth noting that
the interpretation of Article of the 1916 Mexico City Civil Code is not yet a
binding precedent. To require other courts to follow its decision, the
Supreme Court of Mexico should have decided the matter in a plenary
session or resolved the issue having as background two contradictory
rulings from its own Chambers or other Collegiate Circuit Courts.195 The
same principle applies at the state level. But the interpretation of Article
1916 could quickly become binding precedent if judges, including those in
the Supreme Court of Mexico and Circuit Courts, consistently apply,
interpret, or rule on the award of punitive damages in a series of five future
cases, without interruption by any contradictory rulings. 196 For this to
continue happening, lawyers must also cite the February 26, 2014 decision
as a persuasive authority before other courts. Although it is difficult to
establish binding precedents under the Mexican legal system, practice

194. This already has occurred for better in some private law matters. For example, in
2011 the Federal Congress added Article 1464(V), Code of Commerce (Arbitration Statute),
in order to repeal the decision of the Supreme Court of Mexico (Contradiction 51/2005,
First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Mexico, 11 January 2006) whereby the challenge of
arbitration agreements would fall within the purview of courts. The enactment of Article
1464(V) of the Code of Commerce in 2011 endorsed the principle of competencecompetence of arbitral tribunals making clear that “all challenges—be it solely to arbitration
agreements or contracts as a whole—are encompassed by the duty upon courts to refer to
arbitration, and hence are within the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.” See FRANCISCO
GONZALEZ-DE-COSSIO, Amendments to the Mexican Arbitration Statute, 1 INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BRIEF 6 (2011).
195. See ZAMORA, ET AL., supra note 38, at 84. The decision on February 26, 2014 was
rendered by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Mexico.
196. Before, there were five constant and consecutive judgments on a point of law, the
individual decisions are called tesis aisladas. See id. at 85. Currently, there is a more
recent Supreme Court of Mexico’s decision where it stated that punitive damages are part of
moral damages, nevertheless they were not awarded in that case. See Supreme Court of
Mexico, A.D. 593/2015, supra note 182, at 70, ¶ 140.
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shows that lower courts routinely adopt, follow, and consider themselves
bound by prior judicial rulings.197
Accordingly, in order for the transplant of punitive damages to succeed
in Mexico, members of its power structure such as legislators, judges,
lawyers, and academics must promote their proper development and
application in Mexico.
5.3

Establishing the Demand for Punitive Damages In Mexico

As previously mentioned, demand for the transplanted law and the way
it is incorporated in the host country’s institutional structure are also key
factors for successful legal transplants (see Section Four above). 198
Punitive damages will respond to an actual need (demand to fill a legal
gap),199 to raise the safety standards in jobs, goods, services, and everyday
activities with rules that will encourage citizens to help promote the
mechanisms of justice and deter those usually undetected tortfeasors in
Mexico.200 There are no similar rules in place that are likely to be used to
fulfill this demand. In part, this is due to the fact that Mexico is a
centralized system that typically vests law-making powers in the legislative
or the executive branch and that has historically favored centralized law
enforcement mechanisms. The Mexican legal system reflects a rather
paternalistic society where government agencies are expected to intervene
when necessary to protect those who have been injured or disadvantaged
by others.201 For example, if a tragedy happens because of an oil leak in
railway accident, the tort case is often settled out of court with the
responsible party or its insurer paying moderate compensation upon the
intervention of the state or federal government agencies.202 This, in turn,
highlights an important difference in the institutional structure of Mexico
vis-à-vis the United States that may impact the actual demand for punitive
damages. The United States is a decentralized system where law making
and law enforcement activities are allocated to multiple agents, including
197. Id. at 83.
198. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 108, at 208 (stating “that the nature of legal
demand for the transplanted law and the process by which it is incorporated into the host
country's institutional structure significantly affect whether and how the transplant will
function”).
199. Id. at 210.
200. Keith E. Maskus et al., Implications of Changes in Labor Standards: A
Computational Analysis for Mexico, 6 N. AM. J. ECON. & FIN. 172 (1995) (describing how
weak is the enforcement of occupational safety and health standards in Mexico).
201. ZAMORA, ET AL., supra note 38, at 521.
202. Id.
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private parties who may exercise extensive rights to initiate law
enforcement. The United States legal system reflects a society that prizes
individualism because citizens are encouraged to use self-help methods to
preserve their rights to be free of interference and injury from others.203
But part of the reason why Mexicans do not rush to file lawsuits and
are less confrontational in tort matters, is also the old limitations on the
amount of damages that were recoverable in personal injury actions. The
February 26, 2014 decision is an important signal of a new mechanism that
may change Mexico’s institutional structure towards a less centralized
system, at least in civil justice. Now we may assert that plaintiffs and
lawyers have incentives to bring suits under new rules and that judges will
eventually become familiar with the concept or doctrine underlying them.
Although there are no in-depth studies about the incorporation of punitive
damages into Mexico’s legal system yet, which makes punitive damages
look like a sleeping giant, the notes and briefs that have been published by
lawyers reflect that they side with the normative implications of the legal
change. 204 In sum, there appears to be a sufficient demand to motivate
integration of punitive damages in the political economy of Mexico. 205
While Mexico is a centralized legal system, Mexico’s economic expansion
also promotes and requires the adoption of foreign rules that endorse the
rights of citizens in an open economy.206
That being said, there are a few mismatches with the preexisting
conditions and legal institutions of the United States, that we anticipate
may weaken the demand and, thus, effectiveness of punitive damages in
Mexico, making the latter suffer a “transplant effect.” 207 The first
mismatch is a dogmatic one, with practical consequences. The common
law legal tradition regards punitive damages as a type of damages that does
not have a compensatory nature. 208 As commented above, their main
function is to punish the tortfeasor for outrageous misconduct and to deter

203. Id.
204. See e.g., Alejandro Osuna Gonzalez, supra note 183; Salvador Fonseca-Gonzalez &
Antonio Curiel Valtierra, supra note 183; Armando Quintana Freg, supra note 183.
205. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 108, at 210.
206. John S. Wilson & Tsunehiro Otsuki, Food Safety and Trade: Winners and Losers in
a Non-Harmonized World, 18 J. ECON. INTEGRATION 282 (2003); Mark M. Hager, Yankee
Come Back? Occupational Safety and Health Reform in Mexico, 32 U. OF MIAMI INTE-AM.
L. REV. 222 et seq. (2001).
207. Berkowitz et al., supra note 121, at 171.
208. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. 2605, at 2620-21, n.8, and 2623.
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it and others from similar misbehavior in the future.209 This distinguishes
punitive damages from the other types of damages that have a
compensatory nature, i.e., those that aim at compensating for any actual
loss. In the United States, compensatory damages also include losses that
are difficult to quantify in monetary terms but necessary to compensate for
the actual harm caused, such as damages based on loss of companionship,
and pain and suffering, which are equivalent to what were considered as
the moral damages (non-pecuniary consequences) in Mexico before the
addition of punitive damages to the equation.210
Chart Number Two (United States) at the end of this article shows the
basic classification of tort damages in the United States.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Mexico conceived punitive
damages as part of moral damages.211 The nature of moral damages under
Mexican law and all civil law systems is compensatory.212 Moral damages
seek to place the victim or the injured party in the position it would have
been in had the tort conduct never taken place, but also allowed, at the
victim’s choice, the compensation of loss of profits. 213 This type of
damages regards non-physical or spiritual harm related to a person’s
emotional state of mind or social perception and includes, in the words of
the Supreme Court of Mexico, loss of honor (reputation), harm to
appearance (aesthetic), and harm to feelings.214 It aims to redress the actual
nonphysical or emotional harm by means of compensation, whose amount
must place the victim, to the extent possible, in the position it had before

209. Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595 (Canada); Kuddus (AP) v. Chief
Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, [2002] 2 A.C. 122 (H.L. 2001) (England).
210. VARGAS, MEXICAN LAW FOR THE AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 29; Vargas, Moral
Damages under the Civil Law of Mexico - Are These Damages Equivalent to U.S. Punitive
Damages?, supra note 29.
211. As we mentioned in Section 3 above, the reason behind this mismatch is that
Supreme Court of Mexico could not have created the institution of punitive damages as a
new head of damages separated from compensatory damages. Its only option was, thus, to
pretend that punitive damages had always been there as part of the old Mexican law on
liability for tort conduct and breach of contracts.
212. Vargas, Moral Damages under the Civil Law of Mexico - Are These Damages
Equivalent to U.S. Punitive Damages?, supra note 29, at 267 (providing a brief comparative
law survey of moral damages in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland). See also
Cedric Vanleenhove, A Normative Framework For The Enforcement Of U.S. Punitive
Damages In The European Union: Transforming The Traditional '¡No Pasaran!', 41 VT. L.
REV. 348, 349 (2016).
213. Article 1915 of the Mexico Federal Civil Code.
214. Supreme Court of Mexico, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 44-45.
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the tort. 215 Moral damages encompass the pecuniary consequences that
may be calculated with some certainty, such as the expenses of
psychological or psychiatric therapies, as well as the non-pecuniary
consequence or loss that cannot be quantified with certainty but is certain
that occurred, for example, the harm caused by affliction or sadness. 216
The Supreme Court of Mexico “interpreted” moral damages to include
punitive damages to redress their non-pecuniary consequences (see
Subsection 2.4 above).
If we compare Chart Number One (Mexico) and Chart Number Two
(United States), we see a clear mismatch in the nature of punitive damages
in the United States and in Mexico. The Supreme Court of Mexico
incorporated a foreign institution into Mexico’s legal system that does not
match the place and nature that the institution has in its legal origin. The
Province of Quebec, a civil law jurisdiction with regard to its private law
background,217 is well aware of the dogmatic difference between punitive
damages and moral damages. Article 1621 of the Quebec’s Civil Code
explicitly allows for punitive damages to be awarded where it is permitted
by law and states a non-exhaustive list of criteria to be considered when
evaluating the amount.218 But Article 1611 of the Quebec’s Civil Code
distinguishes them from moral damages (préjudice moral in French) that
are part of compensatory damages.
We admit, however, that the relevant question is whether, under the
functional method of comparative law, punitive damages in the “Mexican
style” are “as good of a law as” punitive damages in the United States,
irrespective of the dogmatic difference mentioned above. As we discuss in
Subsection 5.4 below, the function of punitive damages will not be equally
achieved in Mexico, since their compensatory nature will affect the method
215. The Supreme Court of Mexico recognized the compensatory nature of moral
damages in its own decision when stating “[a]sí, puede afirmarse que el régimen de
ponderación del QUANTUM COMPENSATORIO depende de la conceptualización del derecho a
una justa indemnización, de la visión que nuestra tradición jurídica adopta de la
responsabilidad civil y, en particular, del deber de mitigar los efectos derivados del daño
moral [emphasis added],” Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra
note 3, at 93.
216. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 91-93.
217. Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction with regard to the law of property and civil rights
only. The criminal law, public law, or any subject which belongs to federal government is
influenced by the laws of England. See F. P. Walton, The Legal System of Quebec, 13
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (1913).
218. In Quebec, punitive damages were not awarded in private actions until 1991 when
Quebec revised its civil code to include punitive damages. See John Y. Gotanda, Punitive
Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 46 (2003).
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of calculating their amount and, as a consequence, their deterrence
function.
A different mismatch is perceived at the procedural law level. Tort law
in the United States is closely linked to the procedural tools that plaintiffs
enjoy to redress their private rights.219 There are two features of law of
civil proceedings in the United States absent in the Mexican legal system
that may upset the demand of punitive damages in Mexico: the procedural
right to discovery220 and the right to jury trials.221 In the next subsection,
we explain how the absence of these features of the law of civil
proceedings in the United States may impair the proper functioning of
punitive damages in Mexico.
5.4

How Good Law Are Current Punitive Damages In Mexico
Compared to Those From the United States

As mentioned above, one of the functions of the functional method of
comparative law is to serve as a yardstick to determine the “better law.” In
order to determine the “better law,” one must work under assumptions or
hypothesis that one rule accomplishes its function better than another.222
For example, in two rules that are comparable because they endeavor to
have the function, the better law may be the one that, after evaluation, has a
better doctrinal formulation and/or has showed better empirical results.223
In this regard, a relative difference may determine superiority. But it is
worth noting that any evaluation of functional equivalent rules is only valid
with regard to the function scrutinized. One legal rule is not better than

219. John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 611 (2005).
220. This element of the taking of evidence allows a party to obtain evidence from the
other party or parties by means of a request for answers to interrogatories, request for
production of documents, request for admissions and depositions, etc. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26-37.
221. See the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution: “In Suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”
222. Michaels, supra note 160, at 374; Ralf Michaels, Explanation and Interpretation in
Functionalist Comparative Law – a Response to Julie de Coninck, 74 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT / RABEL J. COMP. & INT’L PRIV.
L. 351, 358-59 (2010).
223. Michaels, supra note 160, at 374; id.
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another in absolute terms, at best it may be better regarding a certain
function.224
In the above sub-sections, we anticipated a few differences that may
disadvantage Mexican punitive damages vis-à-vis their American
counterpart. In this subsection, we will focus on the doctrinal construction
of Mexican punitive damages as part of so-called moral damages. The
differences at the level of procedural law will also be briefly addressed.
Four years have passed since the single known Supreme Court case where
punitive damages were awarded in Mexico. 225 Still, it is too early to
provide an empirical analysis of the role that punitive damages have played
in deterring gross misconducts in Mexico. However, we trust that this first
theoretical evaluation will be the start for further empirical or theoretical
analysis.
Mexican law considers moral damages as a type of indemnity aimed at
compensating the victim in a tort case (see Subsection 2.4 above).
However, the Supreme Court of Mexico considered that pursuant to the
legislative history of article 1916 Mexico City Civil Code, the right to a
fair indemnity in Article 1 Mexico Constitution and Article 63.1 of the
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, moral damages may
encompass punitive damages which purport to punish the tortfeasor and to
deter him and others from similar conduct (see Subsection 2.5 above).
This construction of moral damages will influence the method of
calculating punitive damages. If the Mexican judge is required to calculate
an indemnity that at the same time that it deters, it also complies with the
principle of full compensation, which in turn means granting no less and no
more than the non-physical harm ensued (see Chart Number One, Mexico),
the result cannot be an indemnity based on a rational correlation between
compensatory damages and the percentage of harm cases that could go
undetected 226 . The result cannot be an indemnity based on a rational

224. Michaels, supra note 160, at 375.
225. Referring to the February 26, 2014 decision by the Supreme Court of Mexico, First
Chamber, A.D. 593/2015, supra note 182.
226. See Supreme Court of Justice, 19 October 2011, Amparo Directo en Revisión
1068/2011, at 67-68: “the indemnity shall result neither in the enrichment nor the
impoverishment of the victim” (citing González y Otras (“Campo Algodonero”) vs. México,
Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas, Judgment Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 205. ¶¶ 450-51 (Nov. 16, 2009)). As it is the case in the United States for the
calculation of compensatory damages for pain and suffering. See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a
Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for
Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 818 (1995).
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correlation between compensatory damages and the percentage of harm
cases that could go undetected.227
Indeed, the economic analysis of punitive damages in the United States
suggests that these type of damages should be imposed only upon
defendants who would otherwise escape liability through undetected
tortious conduct.228 If the tort system were perfect in detecting every single
wrongful conduct that happens in a jurisdiction, there would be no reason
for punitive damages because compensatory damages in the aggregate
would compensate and also deter.229 This premise results in a formula for
calculating punitive damages whereby their amount should equal to the
harm multiplied by the reciprocal of the defendant’s chance of being found
liable for wrongful activities. 230 Punitive damages so calculated would
achieve their function of deterrence because they would cause defendants
to internalize the full cost of all undetected wrongful activities.231 Some
critics of this standard formula argued that it fails to take into account other
important variables in the tort and litigation system; they suggested that the
standard formula should be completed with analysis of important factors
affecting litigation behavior and valuation, for example, settlement. 232
Others said that more punishment can lead to less deterrence because,
227. In spite of the proposal in the concurrent opinion by Justice Cossío Diaz. See
Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, Voto Concurrente by Justice José Ramón Cossío
Díaz, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 10 (referring to Polinsky, J. OF LEGAL STUD., 675 (U. of
Chicago Press 1997): “Let h be the magnitude of harm and p be the probability that the
injurer will be detected and found liable. Then the proper level of total liability is h/p. This
amount would be composed of a payment of h in compensatory damages and (h/p) — h in
punitive damages. The punitive payment can be rewritten as [(1 — p)/p]h. In the example
in the previous paragraph, h = $100,000 and p = .25, so punitive damages are, according to
this formula, [(1 — .25)/ .25]$100,000 = $300,000.”
228. Robert J. Rhee, A Financial Economic Theory of Punitive Damages, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 38 (2012). However, some submit that juries identify recklessness as an important
consideration in the determination of punitive damages, and that argue that if people
underestimate the effectiveness of care, then it may be optimal to grant large punitive
damages even when there is no chance of escaping liability. See Bharat Bhole & Jeffrey
Wagner, Punitive Damages and The Recklessness Requirement With Uninformed Injurers,
30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 253, 253-54 (2010).
229. Rhee, supra note 228, at 52.
230. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REV. 889 (1998): “If H is the harm and P is the probability of being found
liable, then the injurer should pay H x 1/P—that is, H/P—when he is found liable. Thus,
the injurer's expected damages will be P x (H/P) = H.” See also Kristina Cyglakow,
Puntitive Damages. Conditions, Limits, Proportionality 4 (2016).
231. Rhee, supra note 228.
232. Id.
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although firms might increase safety expenditures to reduce expected
liabilities, they might also reduce the amount of wealth or capital they
expose to those liabilities.233
Be that as it may, the key point in the economic analysis is that the
defendant must pay an indemnity in excess of the compensatory damages
equal to the amount of the harm that it caused for which it would not
otherwise pay. In this regard, considering the cases that go undetected in
the calculation of punitive damages entails admitting evidence of
presupposed harm that is unrelated to the actual physical and non-physical
harm effectively caused to the victim. This possibility would infringe the
principle of compensatory damages under Mexican law because the victim
would be overcompensated beyond her actual loss.234
In spite of the above, the practice of juries and judges in the United
States does not reflect a constant application of the calculation method
described above. 235 Adjudicators have discretion in determining the
amount of punitive damages insofar as their verdict complies with the “due
process clause” in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
Sates Constitution. 236 The due process clause under the United States
Constitution protects both substantive and procedural rights. Substantive
due process directly limits the size of the punitive damages award when
such is constitutionally excessive, as determined on the basis of the
punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio.237 Procedural due process limits
the permissible range of evidence for awarding punitive damages.238 The
Supreme Court of the United States has provided some guidelines for
punitive damages calculation that we will now briefly examine in order to

233. James Boyd & Daniel E. Ingberman, Do Punitive Damages Promote Deterrence?,
19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 47, 48 (1999).
234. See Supreme Court of Justice, Amparo Directo 1068/2011, 19 October 2011, at 6768: “the indemnity shall result neither in the enrichment nor the impoverishment of the
victim” (citing González y Otras (“Campo Algodonero”) vs. México, supra note 226, ¶¶
450-51).
235. Bhole & Wagner, supra note 228, at 253 (2010) (arguing that juries identify
recklessness as an important consideration in the determination of punitive damages rather
than chance of escaping liability). See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
HOW JURIES DECIDE 26 (U. of Chicago Press 2002) (acknowledging that even when jurors
are well intentioned, they do not seem to be capable to apply their understanding of
deterrence to translating their decisions into predictable dollars awards).
236. Hironari, supra note 171, at 385 ff.
237. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams (Philip Morris II), 549 U.S. at 353. See also
Cyglakow, supra note 230, at 8.
238. See Philip Morris II, supra note 237.
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determine whether they fit with the doctrinal formulation of punitive
damages in Mexico.
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Supreme Court of
the United States affirmed an award consisting of USD 200,000 in
compensatory damages and USD 840,000 in punitive damages (a four-toone ratio), stating that “[w]e need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a
mathematical bright line between the [substantive] constitutionally
acceptable and the [substantive] constitutionally unacceptable that would
fit every case.
We can say, however, that general concerns of
reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried
to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus.” 239 In TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed an award with a 526:1 punitive-to-compensatory
damages ratio, stating that only “grossly excessive” awards could be struck
down on substantive due process grounds.240 The Court concluded that the
punitive damages awarded were not excessive in light of the large amount
of money at stake, the defendant’s bad faith, a larger pattern of fraud and
deceit, and the defendant’s wealth.241
On the other hand, the Supreme Court in BMW of North America., Inc.
v. Gore, on substantive due process grounds, reversed a lower court award
with a 500:1 punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio. In that case, the
Supreme Court of Alabama had endorsed the plaintiff’s methodology of
punitive damages calculation that was also based on a rational correlation
between compensatory damages and the percentage of harm cases that go
undetected.242 However, the Supreme Court of the United States found in
that case that the USD 2 million award was grossly excessive under the
substantive due process grounds and that lower courts should consider
instead three elements when determining whether punitive damages awards

239. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1991).
240. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993).
241. Commenting this decision Hironari, supra note 171, at 386.
242. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 564 (1996): “Dr. Gore asserted that
his repainted car was worth less than a car that had not been refinished. To prove his actual
damages of $4,000, he relied on the testimony of a former BMW dealer, who estimated that
the value of a repainted BMW was approximately 10 percent less than the value of a new
car that had not been damaged or repaired. To support his claim for punitive damages, Dr.
Gore introduced evidence that since 1983 BMW had sold 983 refinished cars as new,
including 14 in Alabama, without disclosing that the cars had been repainted before sale at a
cost of more than $300 per vehicle. Using the actual damage estimate of $4,000 per
vehicle, Dr. Gore argued that a punitive award of $4 million would provide an appropriate
penalty for selling approximately 1,000 cars for more than they were worth.”
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are grossly excessive: 1) the level of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct, 2) the punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio, and 3) the
existence of comparable criminal or regulatory sanctions that would apply
to similar acts.243 The Court also held that the award of punitive damages
cannot punish a defendant for conduct committed in another state, as such
would breach the procedural due process principle.244
More interestingly, the Supreme Court of the United States in State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, also reversed on procedural due
process grounds a USD 145 million punitive damages award, because the
state court had allowed evidence unrelated to the defendant’s conduct in
the particular state or with no nexus to the specific harm suffered by the
plaintiff.245 The Supreme Court also stated, obiter dicta, that “in practice,
few awards exceeding a single digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy (substantive)
due process.”246 This has created a presumption that double-digit punitiveto-compensatory ratios may infringe the substantive due process right.
More recently, the Supreme Court of the United States in Philip Morris
USA v. Williams (Philip Morris II)247 vacated the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Oregon in a five-to-four decision stating that punitive damages
shall not be awarded to directly punish a defendant for harm caused to nonparties, as such amounted to a taking of private property without
procedural due process of law. 248 The Supreme Court explained,
nevertheless, that a jury could calculate punitive damages awards based on
the risk that the defendant would cause future harm to the plaintiff, but not
to non-parties, and that a jury could also infer from the risk of harm to nonparties that the defendant’s conduct was particularly reprehensible, but
such non-parties harm may not be taken as the basis of the equation for
calculation.249
Similar limitations under the procedural due process clause in
Mexico’s Constitution would apply to the award of punitive damages in
Mexico.250 Non-parties’ harm could not be considered as evidence when
243. Id. at 574-75.
244. Id. at 572; see Hironari, supra note 171, at 387.
245. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
246. Id. at 425.
247. Philip Morris II, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
248. Id. at 349.
249. Id. at 354-55.
250. Article 14 of the Mexico Constitution stipulates, in the authors’ translation, that
“Nobody may be deprived from his freedom, properties, possessions or rights, but through
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calculating the amount of any type of damages. Moreover, with regard to
substantive due process, the method and amount of punitive damages that
may be awarded in Mexico become problematic in light of the doctrinal
formulation that this type of damages have in Mexico. The United States’
decisions above considered the punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio in
the calculation of punitive damages. But if punitive damages in Mexico
are part of compensatory damages, how could a judge calculate them on
the basis of other similar type of damages? One may argue that the
guidelines above could still be used if we fictionally consider Mexican
punitive damages as something different than the rest of the compensatory
damages. Under this approach, the actual physical harm and the pecuniary
consequences of moral damages could work as the basis for calculating
punitive damages (see Chart No. 1 Mexico). However, the Supreme Court
of Mexico does not seem to have that in mind. In the February 26, 2014
decision, the victim’s parents were not awarded the damage of 77,798.00
Mexican pesos claimed as actual physical harm due to lack of standing at
the time of filing their lawsuit. The Supreme Court of Mexico did not
specify what share of the over 30 million Mexican pesos awarded to the
victim as moral damages intended to redress the pecuniary consequences of
moral damages and what percentage was aimed at restoring to the nonpecuniary consequences of moral damages, where punitive damages now
fall under. 251 Even if the Supreme Court of Mexico had considered a
Mexican moral (including punitive) -to-compensatory damages ratio, we
have to assume that the result of the equation would not lead to
overcompensation of the victim’s parents under the principle of Mexican
law of full compensation in civil liability cases.
Given this background, the American punitive damages are
functionally superior to the Mexican ones regarding the function of
punishment and deterrence. The nature of American punitive damages,
which matches their function, is the first parameter to calculate an amount
of indemnity that creates better incentives to avoid grossly negligent
conducts. On the other hand, Mexican punitive damages will not fulfill
their function as well as their American counterpart because their
compensatory nature places a cap on their calculation. From a law and
Court proceedings pursuant to the basic procedural principles.” The original text in Spanish
states: “Nadie podrá ser privado de la libertad o de sus propiedades, posesiones o derechos,
sino mediante juicio seguido ante los tribunales previamente establecidos, en el que se
cumplan las formalidades esenciales del procedimiento.”
251. This was also part of the criticism raised in the Concurrent Opinion by Justice
Cossío Díaz. See Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, Voto Concurrente by Justice
José Ramón Cossío Díaz, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at. 9.
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economics perspective, the impossibility of calculating their amount on the
basis of the harm multiplied by the defendant’s chance of being found
liable for the same wrongful activity disadvantage Mexican punitive
damages. As one scholar puts it, “[a]fter all, economic analysis is in
essence a refined functional method, one that measures legal rules not by
their doctrinal consistency but by their ability to fulfill societal needs.”252
In addition, the absence of pre-trial discovery in Mexico may also
cause a lower demand for punitive damages in Mexico when compared
with the United States. Pre-trial discovery is paramount in the gathering of
evidence in order to meet the standard of gross misconduct in cases that
deserve the award of punitive damages in the United States. 253 In the
United States, punitive damages will not be awarded unless there is
evidence that the defendant acted in “willful, wanton and/or malicious
disregard of the rights of others” under existing common law.254 This high
judge-made standard has been adopted, though with different wording, in
some state statutory provisions pursuant to which punitive damages will
only be awarded “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”255 In that
regard, plaintiffs’ attorneys need pre-trial discovery to obtain the
production of evidence under the defendant’s control. Such evidence may
include information about the testing of a defective product, 256 internal
memoranda concerning design changes and other recommendations for
safety improvements, 257 the defendant’s failure to warn of potential
dangers, and tendency to exaggerate in advertising its product’s benefits
without also warning of risks involved, et cetera.258 Once the defendant’s
liability has been established, the plaintiff’s lawyers may also seek the
production of documents regarding the financial situation of the defendant

252. Ralf Michaels, The Second Wave of Comparative Law and Economics?, 59 U.
TORONTO L.J. 198 (2009).
253. See generally Dale I. Larson & Robert M. Wattson, The Discovery and Proof of a
Punitive Damages Claim: Strategy Decisions and Pretrial Tactics When Representing the
Plaintif, 11 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 395 (1985).
254. Id. at 399.
255. See e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a) and Cal. Civ. Jury Instructions 3948. Punitive
Damages Individual and Corporate Defendants (Corporate Liability Based on Acts of
Named Individual)—Bifurcated Trial (First Phase). Other state laws’ instructions are very
similar. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 235, at 12-13.
256. Larson & Wattson, supra note 253, at 409.
257. Id. at 410.
258. Id. at 411.
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in order to provide the jury with evidence for the calculation of sums
sufficient to punish and deter the defendant from similar misconduct.259
Pre-trial discovery is unknown to Mexico’s procedural law.260 There
are no developed rules on this issue. In Mexico, the judge controls the
process, and will only order the production of evidence under the control of
the other party if such is material for the case and the requesting party
precisely identifies the evidence concerned.261 That being said, such orders
are rarely requested and granted, since the procedural law principle that a
party has the obligation to prove its case (itself) is consistently applied.
Accordingly, the lack of procedural rules in Mexico that encourage and
facilitate the production of evidence under the control of a defendant, could
be a serious obstacle to a victim’s capability to prove her punitive damages
claim. In fact, the February 26, 2014 decision by the Supreme Court of
Mexico shows that the victim’s parents had no access to any document
under the Hotel’s control that would corroborate a constant gross
misbehavior. The evidence considered regards witness statements and
expert reports offered spontaneously by the victim’s parents or the Hotel
after the accident happened.262 Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Mexico
concluded that the Hotel had been negligent in its failure to maintain
properly the artificial lake’s equipment, increasing the risk of its
customers—not because of the request or forced production of any existing
maintenance diaries kept by the Hotel, but because the Court seems to have
shifted the burden of proof, mentioning that in the Answer to the
Complaint the Hotel did not furnish any evidence to demonstrate that it
kept the artificial lake in optimal conditions for its customers’ use.263 In
the past, the Supreme Court of Mexico had already ruled that in the health
industry, health professionals had the burden to prove that they acted
diligently in performing medical services because the evidence to that

259. See e.g., Cal. Civ. Jury Instructions 3949. Punitive Damages - Individual and
Corporate Defendants (Corporate Liability Based on Acts of Named Individual)—
Bifurcated Trial (Second Phase) […] There is no fixed standard for determining the amount
of punitive damages and you are not required to award any punitive damages. If you decide
to award punitive damages, you should consider all of the following separately for each
defendant in determining the amount: […] (c) In view of that defendant's financial
condition, what amount is necessary to punish [him/her/it] and discourage future wrongful
conduct?
260. ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 38, at 330.
261. Id.
262. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 62-75.
263. Id. at 72, n.92.
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respect is usually under the control of such professionals, clinics or
hospitals.264
The absence of jury trials in Mexico could also cause a lower demand
for punitive damages.265 In the United States, the jury plays an important
role in tort cases.266 If the victim exercises her constitutional right under
the Seventh Amendment, a jury, in lieu of a judge, will assess the value of
the evidence presented by the parties during trial. The jury also decides the
amount of compensational and punitive damages if the plaintiff prevails.
Research illustrates that larger stakes cases tend to be routed to juries rather
than judges for adjudication.267 There are also perceptions in the United
States that juries are more amenable to awarding punitive damages and
awarding higher levels of punitive damages. 268 Some of the reasons
mentioned to explain this difference is that judges possess professional and
reputational interests in avoiding having their damage awards adjusted on
appeal.269
In Mexico, the lack of juries in both civil and criminal trials will
always leave the decision to award punitive damages in the judges’ hands.
This difference may limit the number and sums of punitive damages
awarded in the Mexican context and, thus, affect the deterrence function of
punitive damages.270 In fact, the structural differences between the United
States judicial system and Mexico’s are also a fundamental mismatch that
may make American punitive damages “better law” than Mexican punitive
damages. As a country with lengthy judicial proceedings, justice in
Mexico is less accessible than in other countries with similar economic
characteristics.271 In Mexico, there is a grounded distrust among citizens

264. See Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, Gaceta del Semanario Judicial de la
Federación, Libro 34, Septiembre de 2016, Tomo I, Materia(s): Civil, Tesis: 1a.
CCXXVII/2016 (10a.), at 514.
265. ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 38, at 321.
266. Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in Punitive Damages
Awards: Who Listens to the upreme Court?, 8 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 345, 346
(2011).
267. Id.
268. Id.; Hironari, supra note 171, at 383.
269. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 266, at 328.
270. ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 38, at 322: “the lack of jury system and severe limits
placed on the amount of damages that may be awarded in personal injury suits, helps to
explain the relative lack of tort litigation in Mexico.”
271. Cf. OECD, Judicial performance and its determinants: a cross-country perspective A Going for Growth Report 13 (OECD June 2013).
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towards state courts.272 Distrust is due to the inefficiency of the system of
criminal justice that prosecutes fewer crimes than it should, 273 and also
because of the corruption and negligent practices that impact civil
proceedings negatively.274 Corruption at the lower levels of justice creates
high barriers to access to justice,275 thus, this will influence both the filing
and awarding of punitive damages claims in Mexico. 276 As has been
pointed out, citizens that have experienced unjust outcomes from the
justice system may choose not to rely upon formal legal procedures for the
solution of their justice problems.277
Accordingly, the lack of pre-trial discovery during the taking of
evidence phase of the proceedings and the absence of juries in Mexico’s
legal system will also disadvantage Mexican tort victims in succeeding in
their claims and decrease the demand for the transplanted punitive
damages, making American punitive damages “better law” in
accomplishing their function. In the next section, we propose how to best
fine-tune the incomplete and deficient incorporation punitive damages in
272. Miguel Carbonell, Corrupción Judicial E Impunidad: El Caso De México, LO QUE
4, 5 (Ricardo Méndez-Silva ed., 2010)
(stating than in 2010 surveys reported that only 10 percent of the population had trust in
Mexico’s Supreme Court that enjoys more reputation than lower courts). Mariana
Hernandez-Crespo, A Systemic Perspective of ADR in Latin America: Enhancing The
Shadow Of The Law Through Citizen Participation, 10 CARDOZO J. OF DISP. RESOL. 91, 98,
n. 22 (2008). It has been reported that Mexico ranks among the top 5 OECD countries
whose population perceives its government as highly corrupt, only below Russia, Venezuela
and Paraguay. See OECD, Economic Surveys - Mexico 23, ¶ 24, Figure 11 (OECD ed.,
Jan. 2015).
273. Mexico ranked 93 out of 102 in the Factor 8 Criminal Justice of the World Justice
Project’s Rule of Law Index 2015 which measures whether the criminal investigation,
adjudication, and correctional systems are effective, and whether the criminal justice system
is impartial, free of corruption, free of improper influence, and protective of due process and
the rights of the accused. See World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 30 (2015).
274. In terms of Civil Justice, which regards how much a justice system is accessible and
affordable, free of discrimination, corruption and improper influence by public officials,
Mexico ranked 82 out of 102 countries in the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index
2015. See id.
275. Julinda Beqiraj & Lawrence McNamara, International Access to Justice: Barriers
and Solutions 29 (International Bar Association ed., Oct. 2014).
276. This specifically affects Mexico because before a matter reaches an appeallate
court, parties often have undue dealings with the judge or administrative staff of a court of
first instance. There are numerous examples of corruption practices by Court clerks and
other administrative staff. In one occasion one court clerk was investigated for holding
around USD $30 million on its bank account. Cf. Gustavo Castillo-García, Acumula
Secretario de Juzgado Más de $432 Millones en Siete Años, LA JORNADA, 28 May 2011.
277. Beqiraj & McNamara, supra note 275, at 29.
TODOS SABEMOS SOBRE LA CORRUPCIÓN Y ALGO MÁS
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Mexico in order to achieve a successful transplant following the
recommendations provided by Milhaupt, Pistor, and Örücü.
6.

The Necessary Fine-tuning of Mexican Punitive Damages

Örücü suggested that the tuning of the transplanted law after
transposition is more important to achieve a successful legal transplant than
the source of supply or affinity of a foreign rule with the host system.278
Adjustments to the foreign rule increase its receptivity in the host legal
system.279 Milhaupt and Pistor also submited that the effectiveness of legal
transplants will vary depending on how well the new rules and the host
system adapt to each other.280 The punitive damages rule transplanted into
the Mexican legal system has already been adjusted by the Supreme Court
of Justice’s interpretation of punitive damage as part of moral damages.
But such adjustment has resulted in a mismatch that will likely impair the
proper functioning of punitive damages in Mexico when compared to the
American ones (see Section 5.4 above).
Milhaupt and Pistor submit that adaptation may consist of removing
procedural obstacles to its enforcement and, in general, create the proper
environment and incentives for applying the new law. 281 Under this
guideline, changes in the procedural law allowing pre-trial discovery or the
introduction of the jury-trial would be a positive change to support the
application of the new punitive damages in Mexico. However, Mexican
lawyers are rather unfamiliar with the “adversarial” legal system that
requires some degree of cooperation between the parties during discovery
phase. The use of juries would also involve a fundamental change in the
structure, theory, and practice of civil justice in Mexico. The adoption
these institutions, a different legal transplant in itself, would clash with the
traditional conduct of the local actors who would most likely reject them.
We agree that for successful transposition, adjustments should not
necessarily result in resemblance but rather in harmony. 282 We cannot
expect that punitive damages in Mexico work in the exact same manner as
the American ones in a legal and social context that is different. For that to
happen, the whole civil liability law and procedure in the United States

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Örücü, supra note 98, at 207.
Id. at 208.
MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 108, at 211-12.
Id.
Örücü, supra note 98, at 211.
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would need to be imported to Mexico and not only one isolated rule.283
Still, there is no warranty that such full transposition would make Mexican
punitive damages exactly the same as in the United States. Yet, the
Mexican legal actors could perform some fine-tuning at the substantive law
level that would make Mexican punitive damages achieve their function
better.
The Supreme Court of Mexico’s decision commented in this article is
already a great step forward in this field. Punitive damages are now part of
the Mexican legal system and the legal actors have positive expectations
about this new addition. However, this decision rendered incomplete law
in several aspects, which will need further fine-tuning. The Supreme Court
of Mexico did not provide any guidelines as to the calculation of punitive
damages or the proportion that punitive damages should have in relation to
“actual physical harm” or “moral damages with pecuniary consequences.”
In fact, this was one of the shortcomings highlighted in the Concurrent
Opinion issued by Justice Cossío Diaz, but yet to fill the gap. 284 It
suggested that the Supreme Court should have looked at American
scholarship and case law in order to provide guidelines to calculate the
amount of punitive damages that would deter the defendant from engaging
in similar tortious conducts. 285 However, we demonstrated above that
using such guidelines will be problematic in light of the compensatory
nature of punitive damages in Mexico (see Subsection 5.4 above).
The Supreme Court of Mexico also omitted furnishing the Mexican
legal system with other elements that are required for the optimal
functioning of punitive damages. For instance, the Court did not set the
standard of conduct that would warrant the award of punitive damages.
The commented decision states that the conduct of the tortfeasor was
“serious,” and thus the “degree of liability was high.”286 It also stated that
the activities of the tortfeasor had a “high social relevance.” 287
Nonetheless, it failed to explain whether for an award of punitive damages
a “high degree of liability” where the tortfeasor activity is of “high social
relevance” needed to be established concurrently. It also failed to explain
what elements are to be established to prove a “high degree of liability.”

283. Id. at 216.
284. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, Voto Concurrente, José Ramón Cossío
Díaz, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 12-16.
285. Id. at 14.
286. Id. at 116.
287. Id. at 117.
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Some of the statutory provisions on punitive damages in the Unites
States set the standard of conduct of the tortfeasor stating that no punitive
damages are authorized unless defendant’s conduct involved at least
“reckless disregard”288 or in wrongful death actions or when “the defendant
consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or
malice with regard to the plaintiff.” 289 In the United Kingdom, for
example, punitive damages are limited to three scenarios: 1) abuses of
power by government officials that infringe on individuals’ rights; 2)
injuries caused by defendants who sought profits in excess of harm caused;
and 3) express authorization by statute.290
Similar guidelines by the Supreme Court of Mexico would have been
welcomed by lower courts and the Mexican legal community to implement
the institution of punitive damages in the country. That would have given
them a more clear and precise definition of the permissible contours of
punitive damages and its calculation. Instead, the Supreme Court was
vague and relied only on unrelated ideals such as the victim’s right to
adequate compensation291— in spite of clarifying that punitive damages are
not compensatory in nature in the United States or elsewhere – and, as a
second aspect, “sending a message of official disapproval for the violations
of the human rights in question and the commitment that they will not
happen again.” 292 This last ideal, for example, contradicts the Supreme
Court of the United States’ holding that a jury may not deter a defendant
based on public harm when calculating the amount of an award and that the
jury must base an award only on the circumstances specific to the case at
bar, not on the idea relating to the fulfillment of a greater public duty.293
In addition, the Supreme Court of Mexico has tacitly endorsed the
award of punitive damages in contractual claims. In principle, moral
damages are also available in contract law cases under Mexican law. This
means that, in Mexico, punitive damages, as part of moral damages, may
be awarded for such claims too. In the United States, however, punitive
damages cannot generally be awarded in contract disputes.294 The main
288. See e.g. Okla. Stat. tit. 23 § 9.1.
289. See e.g. Ala. Code 1975 § 6-11-20.
290. Rookes v. Barnard, supra note 77, at 410-11.
291. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at. 86, n.121
(citing Cantoral Benavides vs. Perú, supra note 61, ¶ 53).
292. Id.
293. Philip Morris II, 549 U.S. at 354-55.
294. See e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 9.1(A). Also Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 provides in
relevant part: “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation NOT ARISING FROM CONTRACT,
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exception is in insurance bad faith cases if the insurer’s breach of contract
is alleged to be so egregious as to amount to a breach of the “implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” and is therefore considered to be a
tort cause of action eligible for punitive damages.295 The Mexican legal
actors, in particular, legislators, should further analyze the effects of
adopting punitive damages as part of moral damages for contract claims
and be explicit about the reasons to maintain them or reject them.
The same would apply to the possibility of awarding punitive damages
against the government. Moral damages may be awarded against the
Mexican Federal Government for torts caused by its officials.296 In this
regard, however, the amount of moral damages may not exceed 20,000
times the daily minimum wage in Mexico City.297 On the other hand, in
the United States, the law explicitly precludes the availability of a punitive
damages remedy in cases of federal government’s tort liability,298 while in
the United Kingdom the Crown is subject to exemplary damages.299 Again,
Mexican legal actors should consider whether the English or American
approach is preferable for Mexico 300 and determine accordingly whether
the Mexican law on government tort liability should evolve to allow for the
possibility of punitive damages without limiting their amount or, on the
contrary, to exclude them altogether.

where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant [emphasis added].”
295. Some landmark cases are: Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,
328 (1958) (third-party liability insurance), and Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566
(1973) (first-party fire insurance).
296. See Article 113 of the Mexico Constitution and Article 1 of Ley Federal de
Responsabilidad Patrimonial del Estado. See also Supreme Court of Mexico, First
Chamber, Tesis 2a./J. 99/2014, Semanario Judicial de la Federación, Décima Época, libro
13, t. I, 13 December 2014, at 297. See also generally, Magda Zulema Mosri Gutiérrez,
Análisis de la Ley Federal de Responsabilidad Patrimonial del Estado y de la Ley General
de Víctimas: Desafíos y Oportunidades de un Régimen en Construcción, CUESTIONES
CONSTITUCIONALES 149 (2015).
297. See Article 1 of the Ley Federal de Responsabilidad Patrimonial del Estado (the
2017 daily minimum wage in Mexico City is 80 Mexican pesos, i.e., around 4.5 US
Dollars).
298. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674-75 (2012): “The United States shall be
liable, respecting the provisions of this title to tort claims . . . but shall not be liable for
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.” See also Raboin, supra note 6, at 262
(2016).
299. Id. at 263.
300. For an analysis of the two approaches, see id. at 282 et seq.
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Finally, we know that transplanting a law means to apply effectively a
rule developed in a different socio-economic order in a place with its own
local conditions.301 In this regard, changes in the transplanted rules or legal
institutions indicate that the appropriateness of these rules has been
considered and modifications were made to take into account domestic
legal practice and conditions of the host country.302 Adaptation does not
necessarily require that the transplanted law be changed significantly.
However, at the very least, an informed choice about alternative rules must
have been made.303 Punitive damages would achieve their function better
in Mexico if they were legislated as a specific type of damage, separate
from other types of compensatory damages such as moral damages and
actual physical damages. Legislating punitive damages is the fastest and
most effective way to obtain a better law in Mexico. The strict rules on
judicial precedent and the courts’ restricted task to interpret the law (see
Section Three above) means that it would take many years before courts in
Mexico can develop proper guidelines for the adequate implementation of
punitive damages. The legislative enactment of punitive damages should
be preceded by extensive debates about the adoption of one of several
foreign options. 304 The legislative debates may evaluate the statutory
provisions on punitive damages from some American states or from other
legal systems such as the Canadian province of Quebec, a civil law
jurisdiction at least with regard to its substantive private law. As we
mentioned before, the familiarity with the country of origin is an indicator
of successful transplant. Enacting a rule modeled by the punitive damages
provision in Sec. 3294(a) California Civil Code regarding the standard of
misconduct required for the award of punitive damages, or Article 1621 of
the Quebec’s Civil Code, which explicitly sets a list of criteria to be
considered when evaluating the amount, 305 may not need major
adaptations. For this type of fine-tuning to take place, a strong push from
301. Berkowitz et al., supra note 121, at 177.
302. Id. at 179.
303. Id. at 180 (stating that extensive comparative research prior to the adoption of a
foreign legal system is indicative for an informed choice).
304. Id.
305. Article 1621 of the Quebec Civ. Code states where the awarding of punitive
damages is provided for by law, the amount of such damages may not exceed what is
sufficient to fulfil their preventive purpose. Punitive damages are assessed in light of all the
appropriate circumstances, in particular the gravity of the debtor’s fault, his patrimonial
situation, the extent of the reparation for which he is already liable to the creditor and,
where such is the case, the fact that the payment of the reparatory damages is wholly or
partly assumed by a third person.
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Mexico’s ruling elite or the legal profession will be needed.306 This can
only be possible with the support of educational institutions, proactive
legislators, creative scholars, and diligent judges.
7.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Mexico adopted the legal institution of punitive
damages from the American legal system. However, Mexico’s legal
system is currently suffering from a “transplant effect,” caused by the
mismatches between preexisting conditions in Mexico and the transplanted
punitive damages from the United States. The main mismatch is a
dogmatic one, with practical consequences. The common law tradition
treats punitive damages as a type of non-compensatory damages, since
their main function is to punish the tortfeasor for outrageous misconduct
and to deter him and the others from similar misbehavior in the future. On
the contrary, punitive damages in Mexico are now part of moral damages
that are compensatory by nature. This construction of moral damages will
influence the method of calculating punitive damages in Mexico. Other
divergences at the procedural grounds, such as the lack of pre-trial
discovery rules and jury trials in the Mexican legal system, will also
weaken the effectiveness of punitive damages in Mexico.
In addition, the decision by the Supreme Court of Mexico was
insufficient in several aspects. The current situation will reduce the
demand for punitive damages in Mexico, which is an indicator for
successful legal transplantations.
This means that, despite being
comparable legal rules, punitive damages in Mexico will not accomplish
their function as effectively as their Anglo-American forerunners. The
transplant of punitive damages in Mexico will not succeed unless the
Supreme Court of Mexico receives the firm support from the federal and
state legislatures. Punitive damages would achieve their function better in
Mexico if they were legislated as a specific type of damage, and separate
from other types of compensatory damages such as moral damages and
actual physical losses. Mexican legal actors need a more clear and precise
definition of the permissible contours of punitive damages and its
calculation. Today there are many questions regarding the tortfeasor’s
standard of conduct and the method to calculate the award of punitive
damages in Mexico. Their scope is also too broad to cover contractual
claims and government liability. In light of the Mexican courts’ limited
roles to only interpret the statutory law and the constitutional restriction to
306. Örücü, supra note 98, at 212.
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creating new law, it would take many years before they develop proper
guidelines for the adequate and complete transplantation of punitive
damages. Accordingly, the statutory enactment of punitive damages is the
fastest and most effective way to achieve a better law in Mexico.

Chart Number 1 (Mexico)

Civil Liability
(Responsabilidad
Civil)

Tort Liability

Contract Liability

(Responsabilidad
extracontractual
objetiva y subjetiva)

(Responsabilidad
contractual)

Compensatory
damages
(Daños
compensatorios)

Non‐physical or
spiritual harm also
called Moral
damages (Daño
Moral)

Actual physical harm
(Daños materiales
patrimoniales)

Non‐pecuniary
consequences

Pecuniary
consequences

(extra‐patrimoniales
no cuantificables)

(patrimoniales
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Punitive Damages
(Daños Punitivos)
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Chart Number 2 (United States)

Civil Liability in the
United States

Contract Liability

Tort Liability

Type of Damages

Compensatory

Expenses

Lost Wages

Punitive

Pain and Suffering
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